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THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF A FARM AND FOOD POLICY 
T. K. Warley 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
University of Guelph 
Guelph, Ontario, Canada 
It is a privilege to participate in this seminar. Its issue are 
weighty and urgent. They are of equal concern to Canada and the united 
States. It is important for relations bilaterally and to face the rest of 
the world that solutions for our common problems be, if not identical, at 
least harmonious and mutually supportive. Significant differences now exist 
between Canada and the United States in the directions of domestic farm and 
food policies and in responses to the challenges of a changing world agri-
cultural environment. To identify and explore these differences should be 
mutually illuminating. 
The Setting 
We need to reappraise agricultural and food policies, domestically and 
with respect to foreign trade, in the context of a world economic and politi-
cal system that is in transition. 
The international economic environment is characterized by stumbling 
growth7 rampant inflation7 high unemployment; violent currency realignments7 
severe balance of payments strains; shortages of foods, energy, and some other 
raw materials; confrontation between developed and developing countries on the 
conduct and control of economic affairs and distribution of the world product; 
and uncertainties as to how to deal with the Socialist countries as they enter 
the world economic system on the heels of political detente and rapprochement. 
In this turmoil the cornmon precepts, habits, and institutions of econo-
mic cooperation are eroding. The developed nations are deeply divided on the 
courses of action for dealing with various foreign economic problems. The 
market mechanism for establishing priorities and guiding production and distri-
bution is increasingly called in question. The Bretton Woods system is gone. 
There is a drift towards trade protectionism and towards regulation of 
capital and labor flows. New institutions to deal with new problems (e.g., 
production, distribution and pricing of energy, raw materials, and food; 
allocation of common property rights; and preservation of the global environ-
ment) are created only slowly. More generally, there seems to be more 
concern than before for the costs of international economic interdependence, 
the existence of finite global limits, and our national vulnerabilities. 
The world has not yet accommodated to the reduced hegemonial leadership of 
the United States. There is a growing suspicion that the number, complexity 
and congruence of the changes we have experienced in recent years have 
outstripped the capacity of our leaders to manage and resolve our national 
and international economic problems. The sense of disarray, drift, malaise 
and sclerosis of leadership in world economic affairs is pervasive. 
Agriculture is but a microcosm of these broader problems. Recent food 
shortages and high prices are readily explained. The catalogue of causes is 
now familiar enough. It includes, on the supply side, a faltering of world 
grain production due to weather variation (and possibly climatic change); the 
unwitting depletion of grain reserves; and the cost impact of higher prices 
for energy and fertilizers and accelerating inflation. On the demand side 
would be listed fundamental changes in food and trade policy in the Socialist 
countries; exchange rate realignments; and mounting pressures of growth in 
population and affluence. 
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Internationally the results have been to politicize the problem of hunger 
and malnutrition; to demand increased production and new mechanisms for world 
food security; to recast relationships between food exporters and traditional 
food importers, even as rules are sought for responding to sporadic demands 
by new importers. More importance is now attached to agricultural matters in 
economic and polit1ca~ relations between North America and other politico-
economic groupings in a multipolar world (Europe, Japan, the Socialist 
countries and the LDCs). Also newly appreciated is the growing dependence of 
these regions (other than Europe) on North America's exportable supplies of 
grains and animal feeds, and their consequent preoccupation with our produc-
tion policies, productive capacity, inventory policies and export practices. 
In addition the enhanced economic power which a productive agriculture confers 
on Canada and the United States is recognized. Conversely, North American 
farmers have greater awareness of the importance to them of such matters as 
international energy pricing, currency exchange rates, reserve policy, and 
international rules governing terms of access to supplies as well as markets. 
International dimensions of world agriculture such as those listed above 
have impinged upon domestic agricultural policies and changed their content. 
An inflation led by food prices has sharpened public awareness of the impor-
tance of the agricultural and food system in the North American economy. It 
has likewise focused attention on the system's performance. Restrictive 
policies for production, marketing, and trade have come under critical 
scrutiny by consumers who are food price conscious. More recently, concern 
has been shown for how inflation in general and in energy affects costs and 
production capacity in agriculture and the food system. 
A broader constituency now expresses an interest in agricultural 
and food policy. The influence of the traditional agricultural esta-
blishment has been eroded. Public policy for agriculture has broadened 
to embrace not only considerations of income distribution and producer 
welfare but also the adequacy of incentives to ensure plentiful and 
stable supplies of food. At the same time there has been more perception of 
the need to disaggregate "agriculture," and specifically to differentiate 
between crop and livestock producers -- to recognize their radically different 
experiences in the past three years and their continuing conflicts. Also to 
be seen is a growing awareness of the vulnerability of incomes and asset 
values, even for the sectors of agriculture that are now most prosperous. 
Inflation may narrow the crawl-space between market determined product prices 
and administratively priced inputs. Foreign markets could weaken or collapse. 
The interrelationship between domestic and foreign demands has become a 
critical issue. The policy of uninhibited foreign market development (which 
was appropriate in an era of surplus capacity and low and falling food prices) 
has not gone unchallenged in a period of scarcity. There has been a radical 
change in view of the role of inventories, with new demands that an explicit 
stocks policy be part of farm and food policy. 
These then are some -- and by no means all -- of the changes in the 
international and national settings for North American agriculture which 
compel changes to be made in our foreign-trade and national policies for 
the agricultural and food systems of the United States and Canada. 
National Dimensions 
The current rhetoric of the debate on .agricultural policy in both the Uni-
ted States and Canada has it that past farm programs were too narrow in scope, 
deficient in content, and scarcely relevant to contemporary problems. There 
is convincing evidence tha-c we need a comprehensive farm and food policy, or 
an integrated food policy of which agricultural policy is a part. More 
progress has been made in cataloguing the deficiencies of ·past policies than 
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in detailing the content of a new policy. 
An integrated and coherent national food policy would have at least the 
following attributes. The constituency would be broadened to include 
consumers and those responsible for managing the national economy and orches-
trating foreign economic policy. It would not be narrowly focused on farmers 
and agribusiness firms. Emphasis would shift towards consumers' interests, 
food prices, and the performance of the whole food system. It would no 
longer center on commodities, farmers and primary agriculture. More atten-
tion would be paid to relationships between the agricultural and food system 
and the rest of the economy, and between domestic and foreign economic 
goals. 
A food policy would contain explicit inducements for expanding produc-
tion, replenishing stocks, and dampening the food price portion of inflation. 
It would provide consumers with a more stable supply of lower priced foods 
than they have had in recent years. Equally, however, a food policy would 
provide farmers with an assurance of adequate rewards for expanding output to 
meet growing domestic and foreign demands. An explicit food reserves policy 
would be a part o£ national food policy, and national reserves would be 
integrated into a global reserves system. There would be an explicit policy 
for allocating supplies between competing domestic and foreign demands 
and, among the latte4 between regular and spasmodic commercial customers 
and food aid commitments. Food policy would be equally concerned with 
supplies, prices and returns in livestock and crop production. In view 
of uncertainties about every aspect of the supply, demand and price situation 
world-wide -- except the certainty of periodic dislocations -- the policy 
would provide for flexible response to short run surplus and shortage situa-
tions. 
Opinions will differ on the validity of this concept, its detailed 
content, and the extent to which current farm and food programs in North 
America have some or all of these attributes. My personal judgment is that 
Canada has gone a little further than the United States in trying to evolve 
a food policy. For instance, in Canada the traditional "hands off" policy 
for agriculture has been abandoned and both federal and provincial govern-
ments have introduced a variety of "stabilization" mechanisms for major farm 
products designed to enable the public to underwrite and share with farmers 
the risks of output expansion. Consumers' interests have been explicitly 
recognized in a two price plan for bread grains, and in the termination of 
programs which raised feed grain prices to Eastern livestock producers. The 
Food Prices Review Board was established to act as a guardian and spokesman 
for consumer interests. In the all-important grain sector, the Canadian 
Wheat Board has proved to be an effective mechanism for controlling the 
size of reserves, for allocating available Western grain supplies between 
competing demands, and for dealing with the import monopolies of state-
trading countries. 
Recently our government adopted a radical approach to reducing national 
inflation by imposing certain wage and price controls. This action promises 
to restrain increases in costs of farm production items and of marketing 
services. 
There are blemishes in the Canadian picture. For example, cost indexing 
of support prices has some questionable features. Some restraints on food 
imports are hardly defensible. The practices of some marketing boards are 
suspect. Nonetheless, a genuine attempt has been made to introduce a coher-
ent farm and food policy designed to serve the needs of Canadian society as 
a whole. 
Participants in this seminar are better placed than I to say whether 
current U.S. farm and food programs measure up to the requirements induced 
7 
by changing world and national economic environments. However, even the most 
casual observer must have some questions. For instance, there is a strong 
impression abroad that on key issues the policy of the USDA is to have no 
policy, and that free markets are trusted too much to order national priori-
ties and improve the performance of the farm and food system. To be more 
precise, the level of loan and target rates in the Agriculture and Consumer 
Protection Act of 1973 seems more of a public relations gesture than a mean-
ingful way to share the risks of output expansion. To people in Canada and 
abroad the absence of policies for the livestock sector is incomprehensible. 
And the opposition of USDA to grains reserves, and its apparent conviction 
that U.S. national interests are pest served by maximizing the interests of 
grain growers, a handful of private grain exporting companies, and the import 
monopolies of deficit countries have caused concern both at home and abroad. 
The International Dimension 
In global terms the most important issue is to alleviate the problem of 
hunger and food insecurity. There will, I believe, be widespread support for 
the major conclusions of the 1974 World Food Conference. There is no shortage 
of agricultural capacity world-wide to meet the food needs of the world 
population of the present and near future, but food deficit countries lack 
income and exchange to import the food they need. A strategy for increasing 
world food supplies is imperative but the primary responsibility must rest 
with the food deficit countries. These countries have the potential to 
increase food output greatly but to do so they must make capital investments 
to add cultivable land, irrigation, fertilizers, credit facilities, extension 
services, etc. Even more importantly, they must be prepared to make the 
necessary political investments to give priority to rural development, and 
incentives to rural cultivators. 
Nonetheless, the developed countries can and must help. They can do so 
by expanding their financial assistance to the LDCs and redirect it into 
agricultural and rural development. Opening their markets to the exports of 
the LDC's would let those countries earn foreign exchange to purchase food. 
The developed countries themselves have a responsibility for increasing 
agricultural output, improving global food information systems, and establish-
ing stabilization reserves of basic grains. 
The World Food Conference ended only a year ago and it is much too early 
to judge whether it will lead to effective action. Much of the period since 
the conference has been spent in creating the international institutions the 
Conference recommended. These have made a hesitant start -- for example, 
the World Food Council and the Consultative Group for Food Production and 
Investment. The International Fund for Agricultural Development has not yet 
been set up. 
Not for some years will we know whether the LDCs have made further pro-
gress in food production. Meantime, food aid from the developed countries, 
although not quite at the target level of 10 million metric tons per year, is 
being maintained fairly well and donor countries seem to be living up to 
their commitments to give food aid a high priority in allocating 
available supplies. Equally, there is evidence that technical and financial 
assistance is being expanded in the areas of food production and integrated 
rural development -- perhaps enough to meet Food Conference targets by the 
end of 1976. 
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In today's confrontation between North and South, no developed country 
can neglect the demands of the LDCs for better markets for their exports of 
primary and semi-processed products, and for organizing world commodity trade 
toward an international redistribution of world income. 
Opening more markets to LDCs boils down to lowering the tariff and non-
tariff barriers by which rich countries protect their producers. Few Western 
farmers appreciate how much could be involved. North American producers of 
vegetable oils, cotton, tobacco, meats, hides and skins, sugar, and some 
fruits and vegetables could feel the effects of lowered tariff protection at 
home or any preferences their foreign buyers might give to LDCs. A portent 
of what may come is seen in the problems French and Italian producers now 
face in the European market as a result of new trade arrangements in agricul-
tural products between the EEC and Mediterranean countries, and between the 
EEC and the LDC signatories of the Lome convention. 
Of equal concern is how parts of the UNCTAD's lIintegrated program for 
commodities" might affect North American producers. The program calls, among 
other things, for regulation of world trade in several commodities by means 
of buffer stocks, long term multilateral inter-governmental supply and 
purchase commitments, indexing of LDC exporters' prices, and compensatory 
finance schemes to underwrite their earnings from commodity exports. The 
possibility of adverse impact on North American producers of competing 
products such as rice, cotton, tobacco, peanuts, and sugar needs to be evalu-
ated. Also to be considered are longer-term prospects of moving towards the 
political direction of world commodity trade, even to the point of comprehen-
sive supply management schemes involving export quotas and the sharing of 
world markets. 
The subject of a grain reserves policy is of both national and inter-
national significance. Many take the view that an explicit policy is 
necessary for purely national reasons, particularly in exporting countries 
such as the United States and Canada. Having reserves above working stocks 
would ensure that export requirements are met; that supplies and prices of 
food and feed grains are stabilized for domestic consumers and livestock 
producers; that regular commercial markets are serviced; that even spasmodic 
demands can be filled; and that food aid is not cut off. The subject is 
currently being explored also in the international arena, in the context of 
global food security. 
Efforts are being made to develop national grain stocks policies which 
would provide for meeting food emergencies in the LDCs and stabilize commer-
cial markets as production and demand fluctuate. Preliminary studies have 
been made of the size of reserves required; the likely costs and formulas for 
sharing them; the operating rules; and the relationship between stocks and 
grain trading policies. 
The most sUbstantive discussion is being conducted in the International 
Wheat Council, as a part of pre-negotiations on revising the International 
Wheat Agreement. It is no secret that some difficulties have developed 
between the U.S. and the EEC. Essentially, the United States has approached 
the subject strictly from the point of view of enhancing world food security 
and has put forward a broad proposal for the creation of a 30 million metric 
ton reserve of food grains. Accumulation and release of these reserves 
would be governed by "quantitative indicators,1I i.e., variations in stocks 
and production. The EEC, on the other hand, has argued that stocking 
policies should be but one element in a comprehensive approach to the manage-
ment of world grain markets. EEC spokesmen say that stock accumulation and 
release should be triggered by "price indicators," and the program should be 
the principal means for holding commercial market prices within an inter-
nationally negotiated price range. Further, the EEC has made it clear that 
any understanding reached in the IWC on stocking arrangements must be part 
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of the final negotiated package deal on agriculture and other trade matters 
coming out of the Tokyo/Geneva Round of multilateral trade negotiations under 
the GATT. Hence prospects are dim for early agreement on a world grains 
reserve. 
The international impasse does not alter the terms of considering a 
grain reserve for purely national purposes. Such a reserve can only be 
created and funded by public policy. There is absolutely no prospect that 
reserves for the purposes would be financed and held by the private sector. 
Mention of the Trade Negotiations now in progress in Geneva introduces 
another enduring element in the international farm and food policy. It is 
the conduct of commercial diplomacy to improve access to foreign markets. 
At Geneva, improvement of trade regimes for agricultural products is a key 
item. The environment is not promising. Recession, high unemployment, and 
balance of payments deficits do not make it easy to liberalize trade. Perhaps 
more fundamentally, the present non-managed international monetary system with 
its floating exchange rates discourages attention to reducing barriers to 
trade. GATT prospects are particularly poor relative to farm products. GATT 
has consistently failed in this respect in the past, because governments have 
been unwilling to negotiate on the trade-distorting effects of their national 
agricultural policies, and also major food importers and exporters do not 
have matching trade interests. As in previous negotiations, the united States 
and . Canada are insisting on including agricultural products in the negotia-
tions. They want improved access to their major commercial markets, limits 
on the domestic farm programs of their trading partners, and equitable sharing 
in the costs of food aid and holding grain reserves. Unlike the united 
States, Canada appears to be interested in formal arrangements for grain~ to 
place a floor under world market prices. Presumably this could be provided 
by a renewed International Grains Arrangement containing economic provisions. 
As before, the response of Europe and Japan has not been encouraging. EEC na-
tions are unwilling to negotiate on their domestic farm programs. And with 
North American farm exports running at over $26 billion per annum buyers donlt 
see any urgency about changing their trading arrangements. Additionally, 
they want to become more self sufficient in food and feeds. Their urge to do 
so is sharpened by the shortages and high prices of the past three years~ 
their doubts about North American agriculture's long run supply capacity~ 
and their fears of export controls. Also, their domestic farm programs do 
not appear to be so protectionist and costly at a time of high world market 
prices. 
Above all, there is a fundamental philosophical gulf between the United 
States and the EEC over the issue of whether trade in agricultural products 
has "special characteristics" and whether the aim of the trade negotiations 
is to "liberalize" or to "organize" world markets. Should the present impasse 
in Geneva be broken and sUbstantive negotiations proceed (more likely in 1977 
than in 1976) it is inconceivable that United States' and Canadian restric-
tions on manufactured dairy products and meats could be excluded from the 
negotiations. No service is done North American producers of these products 
by concealing this prospect. And many would argue that a trade-related 
adjustment assistance program must be a part of a farm and food policy. 
Finally, we may touch on another controversial subject in trade negotia-
tions, that of export controls. During shortages exporting countries feel 
pressures to restrict exports of farm products. Short-term political gains 
include stilling the complaints of consumers who are now among the most 
vociferous groups influencing farm and food policy. A short-term economic 
gain is some relief from inflationary pressures, though easily exaggerated~ 
also some benefit to livestock industries. Reduced foreign sales might 
generate increased export revenue, because North America's dominance in world 
grain markets may make export demand inelastic in periods of short supply. 
The dangers of such a policy are longer-term, but no less compelling. 
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Commercial markets abroad could be lost if importers responded by increasing 
domestic production or seeking other sources. The world trading system could 
be damaged as readily by the export of inflation as by the export of unemploy-
ment. And if grain exporters were suspected of intending to make predatory 
use of their "food power," it would become more difficult to outlaw economic 
coercion (as practiced by OPEC and sought by other raw material exporters) • 
A more positive approach would be to encourage adequate production by provid-
ing producers with meaningful minimum price guarantees, to build stocks at 
home and abroad to levels adequate to absorb shortfalls in production, and 
to stabilize the import demand of irregular buyers by multi-year agreements 
such as that recently entered into by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
In Conclusion 
I trust we have touched on enough topics to substantiate the view that 
farm and food policy is not only in a turbulent state but also in transition. 
I have suggested that domestic agricultural policies are becoming embedded 
in farm and food policies designed for a larger constituency, and with broader 
content and m 0 r e objectives. Farm policy is now less isolated from the 
multiple economic concerns of our society. Formulation of farm and food 
policy is now viewed as contributing directly to national economic goals such 
as stable growth, price stability,' external payments balance, and equity in 
income distribution. 
I have portrayed a world economic system in flux and have suggested that 
the international aspects of national agricultural policy now reach beyond 
the customary elements of commercial diplomacy, foreign market development, 
and overseas disposal of domestic surpluses. The international dimensions 
now include the problems of world food supply and security. They must accom-
modate the insistent demands of the LDCs for better market opportunities and 
for some form of world commodity trading arrangements. And such matters as 
reserves, access to supplies, and inter-governmental trade agreements are a 
new content. 
Most of these developments are recent. They make farmers anxious or 
resentful about dilution of their influence. They fear that their interests 
will be sacrificed. And they are concerned that unfamiliar policies may 
contain dangers that they do not detect. 
My judgment is that these changing times will remain favorable to 
farmers. For there is now a widespread awareness that national and world 
goals depend on a productive and adequately rewarded farm sector. This, in 
my experience, is quite new. 
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PRODUCTION COSTS AND THE RESOURCE 
BASE FOR U. S. AGRICULTURE 
by 
Ronald D. Krenz 
Economic Research Service and 
Oklahoma State University 
Agricultural production costs have always been important to both farmers 
and consumers. They have become increasingly important during the last three 
years due to the sharp increases in prices for many farm inputs. From a pol-
icy viewpoint costs are now more important than formerly because Congress is 
seeking alternatives to the parity concept and is considering basing target 
prices or loan rates on production costs. For example, Senate bill S.2274, 
introduced by Senator Bellmon, calls for nonrecourse commodity loans roughly 
equal to 80 percent of the cost of production. 
In this paper I will attempt to discuss only a few of the main problems 
involved in agricultural costs. I will present a few cost estimates but will 
devote most of my time to a discussion of cost concepts and implications. 
Most of my discussion of costs will deal with cost of crop production rather 
than that of livestock. I also will touch briefly on some aspects of the 
U. S. agricultural resource base. 
Recent Changes in Prices of Purchased Inputs 
Since 1973 the price of some purchased inputs has been rising very rapid-
ly. Petroleum-derived inputs have been particularly affected. Changes in the 
price of selected inputs are shown in Table 1. The most rapid increases have 
been in prices for fertilizers, farm supplies (including farm chemicals), and 
motor supplies. Fertilizer prices have receded from recent highs, but it 
appears that for the foreseeable future we will be on a higher level of costs 
for all items derived from petroleum. 
The table shows a marked drop in the price of feeder livestock. One 
might conclude that livestock feeders are now better off. This would be a 
false conclusion. Prices of both feeder livestock and finished livestock 
have been particularly volatile in recent years and so have profits. 
High seed prices reported in Table 1 are partially a reflection of rising 
product prices, as most seeds other than hybrids can be home-grown. Hence 
seed prices rise and fall with product prices. 
Price increases for machinery reflect increases in production items, such 
as steel, labor, and transportation. But they are also a function of strong 
farmer demand. Orders for farm machinery exceeded availability during 1973 
and 1974, resulting in the elimination of the usual dealer discounts. 
Demand for other farm inputs has also been strong • . Spurred by higher 
crop prices the last three years, farmers have demonstrated a very strong 
demand for all inputs including land, machinery, chemicals, and fertilizers. 
Crop producers have complained of rising costs but still have had better than 
usual net incomes. 
Prices of agric~~tural land in the United States rose by 63 percent be-
tween 1972 and 1975.11 what is responsible for this increase in land values? 
Although causal factors have not been analyzed carefully, it can safely be 
presumed that it is primarily a function of farmers' bidding up the price in 
response to current high farm incomes, general inflation, expected good returns 
from future production, or expected appreciation in land values. 
17Farm Real Estate Market Developments j CD-80, ERS, USDA, July, 1975. 
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Table 1 
Increase in Price of Sele~ted Farm Cost Items from 1973 to 1974, 
1975, and Projected 1976 
Increase from 1973 to Item Preliminary Projected 
Feed 
Feeder livestock 
Motor supplies 
Motor vehicles 
Farm machinery 
Fertilizer 
Farm supplies 
Seed 
Wage rates 
Production items, 
interest, taxes 
and wage rates 
Production items, 
interest, taxes 
and wage rates, 
excluding feed and 
feeder livestock 
1974 
17 
-23 
33 
13 
16 
70 
24 
37 
11 
16 
21 
1975 1976 
Percent 
9 1 
-34 -33 
48 80 
35 43 
46 57 
106 88 
45 58 
46 39 
23 33 
27 33 
38 49 
It might be interesting at this point to read a quotation from David 
Ricardo as follows: 
It is not really true that the price of corn is high because ' 
the price of corn land is high. Actually the reverse is more nearly 
the truth: the price of corn land is high because the price of corn 
is high! Its total supply being inelastic, the land will always work 
for whatever is given to it under competition, hence the value of the 
land is completely derived from the value of the product, not vice 
versa. 
This statement of Ricardo in the early l820s fits our current situation 
quite appropriately. 
Effects of Rising costs of Agricultural Production 
What will happen if agricultural production costs continue to rise? cost 
increases are not likely to be uniform across crops and regions. For example, 
let's compare cotton, corn, and soybeans (Table 2). Cotton and corn use much 
more fertilizer and chemicals than soybeans do, hence if costs of petroleum-
related products continue to rise, costs of producing corn and cotton will 
probably increase more than those for soybeans. Also, much less fertilizer 
and pesticides are used in the production of cotton in the high plains of 
Texas and Oklahoma than in the Southeast, Southwest or the Mississippi Delta 
(Table 3). Hence some regions will experience greater cost increases than 
other regions. In this manner comparative advantages will shift among regions 
and between crops. 
1.3 
Table 2 
Change in Cost of Purchased Inputs and Machinery Ownership 
and in Yields, 1973 to 1974 and 1975 
Crop 
Corn 
Cotton 
Soybeans 
Corn 
Cotton 
Soybeans 
Corn 
Cotton 
Soybeans 
1974 
+24 
+ 8 
+14 
+63 
+55 
+33 
-24 
-31 
-15 
Table 3 
Change from 1973 to 
Percent 
Cost/Acre 
Cost/Unit 
Yield/Acre 
Cost Per Pound of Producing Lint Cotton, by Three Regions, 1975 
(Preliminary) 
Region 
1975 
+58 
+35 
+33 
+53 
+31 
+27 
+ 3 
+ 3 
+ 4 
Cost Item S. East Delta So. Plains 
Seed 
Fertilizer and lime 
Chemicals 
Ginning 
Labor 
Fuel, lubrication and repairs 
other 
Total Variable Costs 
Machinery Ownership costs 
.01 
.12 
.13 
.07 
.06 
.07 
.03 
.49 
.08 
.01 
.05 
.07 
.07 
.03 
.06 
.01 
.30 
.11 
.03 
.03 
.03 
.07 
.03 
.05 
.05 
.29 
.06 
Note: These costs are estimated per pound of lint produced. The value of 
cotton seed is not subtracted. 
Will rising costs discourage total crop production in the United States? 
This question cannot be answered without examining demand. If domestic and 
world demand for grains slackens, farmers could experience the same cost-price 
squeeze they faced during the 1960s and early 1970s. On the other hand, if 
world demand and hence exports continue at recent levels, or expand, and farm 
product prices remain at present levels or increase, farmers will likely 
continue to produce and may even attempt to expand production. Actually, our 
knowledge of U. S. agricultural capacity to produce at current cost levels is 
woefully lacking. 
What will be the effect of rising production costs on the cost of food 
to consumers? Rising production costs will undoubtedly raise food prices over 
the long run. But we should be careful not to overstate the relationship. 
For example, if agricultural product prices were to fall so much that farmers' 
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net incomes dropped to zero, consumers would still have to pay for the cost of 
purchased inputs, plus marketing costs. Their saving would not be great. 
Farmers receive only approximately 40 to 42 percent of the consumer's 
food dollar. Processing, distribution, and other services receive the remain-
der. Thus a one percent increase in farm prices should result in an increase 
in food costs of only .4 of one percent. 
In the short run farm prices do not necessarily equal production costs. 
Prices may be above or below costs. In the last few years farm prices have 
risen primarily due to strong demands and not because costs of production have 
risen. 
Effects on World Trade and Balance of Payments 
Agriculture is one of our major sources of earnings of foreign exchange. 
Our competitive position in world trade is one of our major concerns. Very 
simply stated, we need to sell grain to buy oil. Our ability to import de-
pends on how fast our costs go up compared with the rate of increase in costs 
in other exporting countries. For many inputs such as petroleum, fertilizers, 
and chemicals, we are essentially competing in a world market. Hence prices 
of these materials will probably go up for our competitors as much as for us. 
But are we more or less efficient than our competitors in the use of these 
materials? I think more information is needed on this point. However, our 
agricultural technology has developed along lines of cheap energy and cheap 
chemical costs. With rising prices of these items we may be losing some of 
our comparative advantage. To be able to continue to use our present tech-
nology we must look for ways to keep energy costs low or we must remodel our 
technology to conserve on energy use in agriculture. 
Technology of Production 
So far I have been talking mainly about input prices and per acre costs. 
These translate into per unit costs when we begin to bring yields into the 
picture. In the short run, yields are highly dependent on weather conditions, 
but over the long run they reflect primarily the technology of production. 
There has been some concern in recent years that growth in agricultural 
productivity has leveled off. Yield trends have leveled. In the last few 
years we have had some cases of bad weather, and high input prices have also 
discouraged use of some inputs. But are we reaching yield plateaus? will 
yields continue to rise over the long run or are they stabilizing? The answer 
is to great extent a function of technological development. Hence to help 
keep food costs from rising and to remain competitive in the world markets we 
need to strive for continual technological development through expenditures 
for agricultural research and extension. 
The Use of Cost of Production Estimates for Setting Price Supports 
Earlier I mentioned that Congress is now considering basing target prices 
or loan rates on cost of production. Should farmers be paid their full cost 
of production? This at first seems to be a ridiculous question. It would 
seem only fair to farmers to be paid their full production cost. But the 
question is, IlHow are these costs estimated and what costs are to be covered?" 
The return to land is the major issue. As we quoted from Ricardo, "It is not 
really true that the price of corn is high because the price of corn land is 
high; actually the reverse is more nearly the truth •••• " If product prices 
were guaranteed to cover full production costs, including land costs, they 
could cause land values to rise further, thus giving cause to increase 
guaranteed product prices further, and so on. The beneficiaries of such a 
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price-cost cycle would be the landowners at the expense of consumers. Should 
the government guarantee returns to land? This issue needs to be examined 
very carefully before government programs are established. 
The Resource Base for U. S. Agriculture 
Now finally to the item of our agricultural resource base. What can we 
say about it? Generally, when this topic is brought up for discussion we 
immediately think of the land resource. How much land do we have? Is it 
adequate in quantity and in quality, etc.? 
In a recent ERS report titled "Farmland -- will There Be Enough?" the 
authors point out that the acreage of cropland in the united States has 
remained fairly stable since 1950, about 385 million acres.lI However, for 
several decades there has been a shifting of about a million acres or more 
per year out of cropland, mostly in the South and East. This in turn has been 
offset by reclamation, drainage, land clearing, expanded irrigation and reduc-
tion in summer fallow in other parts of the country. This shift has kept the 
total u. S. acreage of cropland fairly constant and has actually improved the 
quality of the land under cultivation. 
They point out that future growth in agricultural productivity will come 
from added acreage and from greater productivity per acre. Their analysis of 
the potential for increasing cropland acreage is summarized in Table 4. They 
indicate that there is a potential for increasing cropland by 265 million 
acres. They have divided this land into several categories as to the potential 
for shift, and cost involved in a shift. The bulk of the land categorized as 
having a high potential for crop production in the short run are grasslands in 
the Great Plains and Corn Belt that are currently being used for grazing. All 
of the lands with long run potential, both in the high and medium categories 
(columns 2 and 4) need drainage development. The 29.2 million acres in column 
3 (medium potential in the short run) are currently lands that are in 'Texas, 
Oklahoma and the Southeast Coastal Plains and Piedmont. The 112 million acres 
in column 5 (low potential) is generally land that has erosion problems, is 
in scattered fields, has a short growing season, or has a water shortage. 
The authors' overall estimate is that approximately 100 million acres 
are physically well adapted to crop production and could be brought into 
production within two decades. On the other hand, conversion of much of this 
land would adversely affect the livestock economy. The forage now produced 
on this land would have to come from other sources or a considerable reduction 
in our beef breeding herd would result. 
Obviously any of these lands would be less profitable to operate than 
land currently in crop production. The rate at which these lands can come into 
crop use will depend to a great degree on expected long run product prices. 
Hence we can conclude that if farm product prices rise, more production will 
be forthcoming. 
However, on the other hand I would hesitate to put too much emphasis on 
measuring our fut~e productivity on the basis of acres of land. During the 
last decade or so it was generally assumed that we could control agricultural 
production by limiting the land resource. For instance, in many of our past 
governmental agricultural programs we tried to control output by setting 
acreage allotments. To our dismay we found that farmers could devise many ways 
to increase output by substituting fertilizers, chemicals, machinery, etc., 
for land. This ability to expand production on a decreased land base will put 
us in good stead in the future in terms of expanding total output. 
y .' ' .' . Cotner, M. L., M.D. Skold and o. Krause, "Farmland -- Will There Be 
Enough? II ERS-584, ERS-USDA, Washington, D. e. , May, 1975. 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Table 4 
Estimated Acreage of Land in the u.s. Potentially convertible 
to Cropland 
Relative Potential for Conversion 
High Medium 
Region Short Longl Short Long l Run Run Run Run 
Million Acres 
Plains 48.1 4.1 
North Central 15.5 13.8 
Florida 1.1 2.9 
Mississippi Delta-Gulf 3.5 6.7 
Coast 
Coastal Plain-Piedmont 18.2 19.8 
Atlantic Coast Lowlands 1.3 7.4 
Texas-Oklahoma Prairies 9.7 .6 
APpalachian-ozark3 
Northeast-Northern Great 
Lakes 
Rocky Mountains-Far westS 
Total 68.2 27.5 29.2 27.8 
1 . Dra~nage necessary. 
2 Forest and other land with erosion problem. 
3Fields small and scattered. 
4Short growing season. 
5water shortage. 
Low 
2.6 2 
7.72 
2 
.82 
27.3 2 
.52 
2.02 
24.9 
32.4 
13.6 
111.8 
It is my opinion that we ought to give equally as much or more attention 
to the development of technology as a basis for expanding food output as to 
the expansion of cropland acres within our boundaries. 
Summary and Conclusions 
I hope the lac~ in this presentation, of hard numbers on current costs 
of production is not disappointing. However, the theme of this policy seminar 
is "In Search of a U. S. Food Policy." To examine this issue, costs of produc-
tion are relevant but must be kept in proper prospective with respect to such 
major issues as world population and food pressures, world trade, levels of 
disposable income in the united States, and technological development in 
agriculture. Production costs result from the intersection of the broad forces 
of demand and supply and these are the major forces that we should be examin-
ing in our deliberations at this seminar. 
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, PRICE, AND INCOME 
POLICY WITHIN A NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 
v. James Rhodes 
Professor of Agricultural Economics 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
I propose to address two major sets of questions: (1) what is the sit-
uation of today's agriculture and (2) what is today's national economic policy? 
After that two-pronged, broad-brush survey of "what is" I shall make some 
suggestions as to "what ought to be," i.e., some suggestions for policies 
concerning agricultural production, price, and income. 
A guiding principle in this discussion is to rely upon very limited pre-
dictions about the future. Uncertainties these days are too many and too 
massive to permit much reliance upon specific economic projections. If we 
cannot make good predictions about many economic magnitudes, it is most es-
sential that policy recommendations recognize the narrow limits of our fore-
knowledge. 
Current Agricultural situation 
Agriculture is now in a staggeringly different situation than at any 
time since World War II. A few of the changes seem to be permanent while 
others puzzle us as to whether they may be very temporary. As Breimyer has 
remarked, it is difficult to separate the passing from the lasting. Let me 
summarize with 5 observations: 
(1) U.s. agriculture has a new world position in which it is much more 
dependent on the rest of the world, and vice versa, than ever before in 
peacetime. 
(2) Agriculture is geared for all-out production with no governmental 
restraints on output. 
(3) Farmers face the probabilities of continued major swings in market 
prices because there are neither grain reserves to cushion price increases 
when crop shortfalls, nor reasonably effective price and income support 
levels should crops be overly large. 
(4) Farming is more industrialized, is larger scale, and is more sub-
ject than ever before to a cost-price squeeze, or a crisis in cash flow 
accompanying a crop failure. The cattle industry is still reeling from the 
sudden and drastic jump in feed grain prices. 
(5) Farmers are less able than ever before to determine their own des-
tiny, and they face the contest of more groups who are actively involved in 
determining farm and food policy. 
One cannot overemphasize the extent to which the sudden increase in our 
agricultural exports has altered agricultural prices and incomes. Four short 
years ago we reached a realized gross farm income of $60 billion, up only $2 
billion from the previous year. Realized gross hit $97 billion in 1973, an 
amazing jump of $37 billion in two years. Realized gross in 1975 is expected 
to be just over $100 billion. 
This explosion in gross farm income came about through increases in 
prices, not output. The index of farm output for 1974 was 5 points below 
1971 and 1975's index will likely be only 2 points above 1971. 
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What caused this massive jump in farm prices? Some of it can be attri-
buted to demand inflation in the united States, even though it is equally as 
easy to blame some of the inflation on rising agricultural prices. However, 
the major cause is the sudden jump in export demand for our agricultural pro-
ducts. otherwise, we might be facing for 1975 a realized gross farm income 
of, say, $70 billion rather than $100 billion. That $30 billion difference 
is perhaps a crude measure of our new dependence upon foreign markets. 
I take it to be unpredictable whether this favorable export demand and 
price situation will continue. I believe that a situation about midway 
between 1971 and 1975 prices and incomes is the more likely. Too often farm 
policy-makers have tried to chart the future rather than accept the unpredic-
table, unforestallable events that corne farming's way. It is the path of 
wisdom to recognize wherein we do not know and cannot know. 
As to the second point, the acreage reserves are gone. The old histor-
ical allotments had little, if any, impact on 1975 production patterns. The 
Secretary of Agriculture exhorted farmers to all-out production. Ad hoc 
attempts of various farmers in 1975 to restrict crop planting voluntarily 
came to nought, for reasons plain to all who have studied the motivations to 
be free riders in such voluntary efforts. 
The third point concerns price fluctuations. In the past 3 years we 
have seen price fluctuations so large that they still seem incredible. with-
out crop reserves, we know that the previous peaks could readily be surpassed. 
Unpredictable crop failures in any of the major breadbaskets and rice bowls 
of the world could lead to sharply higher export demands. The higher income 
part of the world including the Communist Bloc & OPEC does not plan to cut 
consumption materially if there are harvest shortfalls. It is able to 
finance fantastic speculative sprees, such as we saw in soybeans and sugar, 
as buyers fight for marginal supplies. 
On the other hand, prices that are pushed up by high and possibly transi-
tory foreign demand can also fall precipitously. Loan rates at $1.37 on 
wheat, $1.10 on corn, and 25¢ on cotton are so low that they seem quaint 
relics of another era. Target prices are a bit higher, of course, especially 
for wheat and cotton, but they are hardly reassuring to farmers in today's 
inflated economy. 
National Economic policy 
What is our 'national economic policy? Amidst the confusions, turmoil, 
and failures of the past few years, the temptation to be cynical is nearly 
irresistible. I will try to play it straight and to view the proverbial 
water glass as half full rather than half empty. 
Among the many economic policies of this large and affluent economy of 
ours, the more important for our purposes concern: 
1. Inflation 
2. Unemployment 
3. Bail-out 
4. Mediation and trade-offs 
5. Oil and grain 
6. Growth 
7. Adequate food for all at "reasonable ll prices 
Control of inflation and reduction in unemployment are probably the 
leading contenders for top priority with our economic policy makers. I'm not 
supposed to be an expert in this area of macro-economics --thank goodness. 
It is no secret that this area is presently a source of deep professional 
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embarrassment among economists. There are widely conflicting views on how 
we can get out of our muddle. Thus far the government holds to the neo-
Keynesian orthodoxy that there is a trade-off between inflation and employ-
ment. Persistent voices in the wings argue to little avail that there are 
several kinds of inflation and that it makes no sense to treat our present 
kind with a big dose of unemployment. 
At this point, a speaker usually predicts rates of inflation and unemploy-
ment to be expected in the future and then draws a lesson for agricultural 
policy. I decline to predict the unpredictable. If we have a continued rate 
of inflation that is 6 percent or more, the impact on farmers will be severe. 
Farmers are price-takers and their ability to pass on increases in input costs 
is more limited than that of the price-makers in most of the rest of the 
economy. After a lag, farmers do pass on increases in costs by reducing 
their supplies, but it is a long lag. Thus in a game in which everyone plays 
"pass the hot potato of inflation, II it's the farmers' slow-moving hands which 
will get the most blisters. Therefore, if inflation continues, we may see 
within 2 or 3 years a call for income protection for farmers. While it is 
obvious that the best IIfarm policy" in this case is inflation control rather 
than income subsidies to farmers, we may find ourselves -- again -- dealing 
with second-best solutions. 
Farmers' concerns about urban unemployment are less clear cut than 40 
years ago. The correlation between fewer jobs and lowered farm prices is no 
longer very high -- at least, within our current frame of experience in the 
1970s. Likewise, the fewer numbers of farmers migrating to urban jobs has 
reduced, although certainly not eliminated, farmers' historic concern for 
full employment (to assure jobs for them or their kids). Of course, farmers 
have political concerns about the social and political impact of a long-
continued high rate of unemployment, and they certainly have humanitarian 
concerns. Yet on balance, today·s rate of unemployment seems less threatening 
to farmers than today's rate of inflation. This tendency of each industry to 
look after itself -- first, last, and always -- is a threat to social 
stability. Perhaps farmers ought to worry more about people without jobs 
than about the price of hogs, but I doubt that they do. 
Someone defined a firm as "too big" when it is so large that the govern-
ment cannot allow it to fail. Recently, the bailing out of such firms, and 
of public enterprises as well, has become a major activity of government. 
The big names are familiar: Lockheed, Pan-Am, Franklin National Bank, the 
Northeast railroad system, and probably New York city. Does anyone doubt 
that the list will grow longer? If one reads Professor Hyman Minsky's des-
criptions of our national financial environment made fragile by too much 
leverage and too much practicing of all those smart financial practices 
taught in the best Business Schools, he can lie awake nights waiting for 
another 1929. The one positive lesson for farm policy which just might come 
out of this mess would be an examination of our national love affair with 
bigness. Perhaps we might even regain some appreciation of individual enter-
prise and the competitive market-place. However, another possibility is 
that we will increase inflation by running the printing presses to bailout 
all kinds of organizations which decline to live within their income. 
Another major area of economic policy is mediation among the power 
centers as they struggle to determine where this country is going and who gets 
what. In a broad sense, this activity embraces all the others, but there 1S 
merit in looking at it separately. The people on center stage vary from day 
to day, but frequent appearances are made by George Meany, the Seven Sisters 
of the petroleum world, the environmentalists, the consumer spokesmen, the 
organizations of federal, state, and municipal employees, etc. In the 
phrasing of Arthur Okun, we are engaged in a massive trade-off between efficien-
cy and equity, illustrated in the many billions in the HEW budget, in Food 
stamps, and all the rest. The Ways and Means Committee is the scene of many 
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a struggle to determine whether the progressive income tax means something or 
is only a facade to fool the simpleminded. This fall, President Ford found 
himself caught between grain producers, livestock producers, consumer groups, 
shipping lines, and George Meany over grain sales to the USSR. Truly, those 
who govern find themselves constantly mediating among opposing interests. 
A sociologist describes the situation by saying that farming was a game 
of people against nature, but that our postindustrial economy is a game of 
people against people. Farmers are comfortable with an ideology that glorifies 
a game against nature, but they generally prefer to pretend that they don't 
engage in games against people. Much of agriculture's intellectual leadership 
has rejoiced over the past 30 years as agriculture has become more integrated 
into the rest of the economy 7 what they now need to face is that agriculture 
will more and more be a part of power center mediations. The results of the 
industrialization of agriculture include not only four-wheel drive tractors 
and an astounding rate of use of fertilizer, but also head-on collisions with 
George Meany, Ralph Nader, and even the Ways and Means Committee. The dislike 
of farmers and their leaders for this new power game is exceeded only by their 
lack of skill in playing it. 
Oil and grain -- how to buy the one and sell the other? It seems incred-
ible that we, a world power, should stumble along for three years in the 
stranglehold of a few politically insignificant powers such as OPEC. While 
the surprises on the grain side were a bit smaller than on the oil side, they 
were surprises, too. 
Dealing with OPEC is a problem of awesome magnitude. There is little 
evidence that we have an overall economic policy. We obviously have attempted 
to make policy. One aspect relevant to agricultural policy seems fairly 
clear. In an attempt to balance our current accounts in international trade, 
the government has come to recognize and appreciate our comparative advantage 
in the production of grains, oilseeds, and cotton. 
One lesson of oil and grain is that our national economic policy has been 
much too insular. We didn't worry much about economic interdependence with 
the rest of the world because our trade was relatively so small -- exports 
down around 6% of GNP, for example. We are now, belatedly, discovering how 
much events beyond our shores determine the course of domestic events. 
Farmers have little influence over those exports on which they so largely 
depend. live already described the staggering extent to which current agri-
cultural prices and incomes depend upon present export demands. American-
farmers are obviously in a position in which they depend upon forces not 
subject to American control. More painful to accept is the fact that even in 
those matters subject to our control, the interests of 
our diplomacy and of our farmers need not always coincide. It is already 
painfully clear that, first, our agricultural exports are of interest in the 
Departments of State and Treasury, and perhaps even in Defense, as well as in 
Agriculture, and, second, that Agriculture may have less policy influence at 
times than the other Departments. Truly, farming has 1qst much of its unique-
ness! 
Growth was the sacred cow of the third quarter of the 20th Century. 
Kennedy ran for President on the theme of getting this country moving again. 
It was widely believed that the most effective counter to the Russians was to 
keep our rate of growth above theirs. The most serious implication to many 
people of the demands of the environmentalists has been that they might slow 
our rate of growth. 
OPEC and the realization of how limited is the world's supply of readi1y-
available fossil fuel have occasioned a most serious challenge to the whole 
philosophy of growth. Some people have already outlined needed investments of 
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a half trillion or more dollars in order to surmount this new obstacle that 
separates us from the Holy Grail. But two years ago at this seminar, Profes-
sor Phil Raup argued that we, like primitive hunters, harvested the low-
hanging fruits of this planet first, and we will be hard pressed to stay even 
let alone grow. Others of the pessimists about future growth give the impres-
sion that growthls benefits have been grossly over-rated and its side effects 
have frequently been debilitating. It is time, they say, that we get off a 
materialistic growth binge that cannot last. 
However, if growth is over the social adjustments may be quite difficult. 
Thus far, growth is still our national policy. In its name we are continuing 
such economic nonsense as the provision of tax shelters to oil drillers, real 
estate builders, and cattle feeders. In its name we may achieve great tech-
nological breakthroughs or we may build white elephants which will make the 
pyramids appear useful. Farmers with good incomes will continue to be tempted 
toward ever larger capital investments in order to write off investment 
credits, depreciation, and interest against their income taxes. Thereby the 
structure of agriculture is further altered. 
The seventh and last item on my list of national economic policies is 
titled "adequate food for all at reasonable prices." It is a two-edged sword 
as far as farmers are concerned. Our national commitment that our citizens 
shall eat in spite of unemployment, recession, or poverty has materially 
stabilized the domestic demand for food. Parenthetically, farmers and farm 
editors, in their current peeve against George Meany, have become extremely 
critical of Food stamps, a main girder in the governmental support of domestic 
demand for food. While these farm critics may be ready to throw out the baby 
with the bath, it is doubtful that they will so influence the congress. The 
other side of this seventh government policy is a determination to prevent 
sudden, large jumps in consumer food prices. Thus far the government has 
been notably unsuccessful in doing much to stop food price rises. Government 
economists understand how to join with corporation heads in administering 
what were formerly privately administered prices. They find it frustrating 
to deal with agriculture with its market-determined prices and its long supply 
lags. Nevertheless, governmen.t will do some things to promote what farmers 
call a "cheap food policy.1I 
Suggestions for a Farm and Food Policy 
My suggestions here are made as a citizen. While I think lim quite 
sympathetic with the interests of farmers, these suggestions are not made as 
a protagonist for those interests. There is truth, however unpalatable, in 
the aphorism that wars are too important to leave solely to the generals, and 
farm policy is too important to leave solely to farmers. If you pressed me, 
I might even concede that education is too important to leave solely to us 
educators. In current parlance, lim adressing myself to a farm and food 
policy in which concerns about foreign markets and consumer interests share 
billing with farmer interests. 
live been making professional suggestions about farm policy for 20 years. 
But I think I start this time with a fairly clean slate, because of all the 
changed conditions which live been enumerating. I might add that I find my 
position to be reasonably consistent with other agricultural economists, as 
illustrated by Ken Robinson's presentation in August to the meeting of 
American agricultural economists and Luther Tweeten's September presentation 
to the National Farm Policy Conference. 
Two principles were much on my mind as I considered alternatives. The 
first was to prepare for the unpredictable, and the second was to adopt a 
much more international outlook. 
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How does one prepare for the unpredictable? The first rule is to play 
it conservative and try to hedge against the real disasters, without worrying 
about meeting every minor eventuality. The second rule is to be flexible. 
Among other things, that suggests a discounting of one's favorite nostrums of 
yesteryear. It also suggests that one remain skeptical enough about predicted 
events that he can deal with real events as they occur. 
I think I've belabored enough our new international interdependence to 
illustrate what is meant by a more internatipnal outlook. Quite simply, our 
agricultural productivity is a very important national asset. Food is an 
element of international power. We can expect to encounter many political 
and economic opportunities. for the use of our food. Used wisely, our exports 
can influence world events' and help to pay our oil bill, as well as provide 
a major segment of farm incomes. On the other hand foreign markets may 
diminish suddenly and sharply and create some tough adjustment problems for 
U.S. farmers. 
I find acceptable the general objectives stated in the most recent CED 
report on agriculture. That report advocated farm programs lito assure 
adequate supplies of food in all circumstances, reasonably stable food prices, 
and a steady flow of exports even in years of short crops.lIl 
My suggested policies involve a three point program: 
(1) begin to build government-held reserve stocks of grains and 
soybeans 7 
(2) rely on loan rates rather than direct government payments to 
underpin farmers' incomes until adequate reserves are built7 
those loan rates should reflect the current non-land costs of 
production 7 
(3) eliminate as much price variation as possible from domestic and 
world markets by judicious reserve management policies. 
Reserves, controversial though they may be with grain producers, are 
central to these policy proposals. Reserves are essential for four reasons: 
(1) A major exporter cannot operate from bare shelves. We must have a 
demonstrated capacity to supply if others are to depend on us. (2) If the 
State Department is to employ food in international chess games, we must 
have stocks. (3) It is neither efficient nor equitable to injure our 
livestock economy with sharply fluctuating grain prices. (4) The building 
of reserves during periods of oversupply and the drawing down of reserves 
during seasons of crop failure is the essential bridge between farm and 
food policy -- between farmers' and consumers' interests. 
Many of you will quickly recall the burdensome surpluses of the past and 
you will predict a recurrence. That is your prediction. Surpluses qre 
obviously a possibility, and if they develop we will have to deal with them. 
At such times we should interpose target prices, and, if necessary, move back 
toward production controls to stop excessive build-up. We have had years of 
experience with various techniques although we ought also to examine new 
methods of production control. Meantime, the reasons are very compelling for 
escaping from the bare cupboards of the past two years. 
The mechanics of government reserve storage should allow for voluntary 
farmer participation in holding the grain, as has been true of much of the 
past. I won't attempt to suggest the exact levels of acquisition and release 
prices. I concur with CED that they should be set at a level that obtains an 
lCommittee for Economic Development, A New U.S. Farm Policy for Changing 
World Food Needs, October 1974, p. 21. 
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adequate and sustained production but not an accumulation of burdensome 
surpluses. lim expecting Ron Krenz to show us that the USDA has good enough 
models these days of the production costs of various enterprises to determine 
pretty accurately what price levels make sense in terms of those objectives. 
Some procedure for keeping pace with .inflation is obviously essential. 
However, Secretary Butz is entirely correct in his assertion that inflated 
land costs cannot be allowed into a meaningful cost-of-production formula. 
What should be the guidelines for acquiring and holding our reserves? 
A 30 million ton holding of wheat and rice by other nations was proposed in 
late September by the United States. Various guidelines have been advanced 
for management of our own reserves. They vary from the cost or social loss 
minimization stUdies of the econometricians to CEDis ad hoc recommendation 
that stocks be held until prices are twice the acquisition price. The CED 
price guidelines are too wide. For example, letting corn prices rise from 
a $2 acquisition price to a $4 release price would re-inflict on the livestock 
and poultry industries all the disruptions through which they have just 
suffered. I reject any implicit assumption that the guidelinels chief 
objective is to maximize the long run incomes of crop producers. In my book, 
reserves are to serve the several objectives already discussed and the guide-
lines must reflect all those objectives. 
One approach to the management of reserves is what I call lithe isolation 
approach. II It is to acquire specific stocks and isolate them from the market 
as much as possible, expecting to use them only very occasionally in times of 
massive crop failure or a military conflict. This is the crop farmers I maxim, 
that "we can tolerate reserves if you promise not to use them." The CED 
proposal is a moderate form of this isolation approach. 
A second approach may be called lithe thermostat approach." It would 
keep reserves much more closely attuned to the market with the expectation 
of using them almost every year either to raise or lower market supplies. 
Both approaches have merit. If you are quite suspicious of either the 
aims or the administrative effectiveness of government, you may incline 
toward the isolation approach. Crop farmers, for obvious reasons, donlt want 
the competition of sales of stocks even though they benefited previously from 
purchases of those stocks. However, their interests are too narrow to be 
allowed to dominate this part of our food policy. lim inclined toward the 
thermostat approach because it makes reserves the link between the various 
competing interests relating to farm and food policy. 
Some possible guidelines for a thermostat approach to reserves might be: 
(1) set by law a maximum quantity limit on the reserves that would be 
held under any circumstance -- e.g. one billion bushels of feed 
grains~ 
(2) set by law certain guidelines as to acquisition and release 
policies, with requirements as to when the Secretary shall announce 
his specific policies for the coming crop year. For example, these 
guidelines might state that acquisition and release must be a 
function of size of current stocks in relation to the maximum limit 
and also market prices. Thus the policy might be to release more 
stocks as either (a) the reserves are close to the maximum permitted 
and/or (b) market price is further above non-land cost of produc-
tion. Likewise the policy might be to acquire more stocks as either 
(a) reserves are very low, and/or (b) market price is further below 
non-land cost of production. Within that legal framework, the 
Secretary might announce each winter the specific price-quantity 
guides that would be followed for the next crop year. 
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with this thermostat approach the gap between initial acquisition price 
and initial release price would be fairly narrow, but it also must widen with 
the quantities taken. As purely illustrative figures: 
Market Price of Corn Government Action 
$2.00 to 2.35 None 
1.75 to 2.00 Buy 50-200 million bu. 
1.50 to 1.75 Buy 200-400 II II 
1.50 or lower Buy 400-500 II II 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2.35 to 2.50 Sell 50-100 II II 
2.50 to 2.75 Sell 100-200 II 
2.75 to 3.00 Sell 200-300 II II 
3.00 or more Sell 300-400 II 
The buy-and-sell quantities and prices need not be symmetrical. If 
stocks are quite small, the government should be more eager to buy than if 
they are large. While the initial buy or sell prices should be closely linked 
over time to the cost of production, the specific schedules of price-quantity 
relationships would be subject to considerable variation as stocks and world 
conditions change. 
While the release price of grain would typically be above the price at 
which it was purchased, since production costs typically rise over time, that 
would not be a formal requirement. If the reserves policy is to be market 
oriented, sales prices cannot be tied to previous purchase prices, despite 
many suggestions to that effect. 
I'm aware, as already suggested, that a variety of formulas and spec-
ifications always require detailed and thorough analysis and even then are 
subject to much trial and error. Therefore, please regard my proposals as 
purely illustrative -- I am not prepared to defend them in detail. But I 
hope that they challenge directly the rather popular thesis that the mere 
existence of reserves destroys all price-making forces. 
But you ask, aren't reserves really disguised surpluses? Aren't you 
really sneaking in income support for farmers under the guise of acquiring 
adequate supplies for domestic and foreign markets? Obviously the answer to 
both questions could be yes. The development of a sensible reserves policy 
faces two very significant problems. One is short-sightedness. Many people 
are quite capable of worrying about famine one year and about surpluses the 
next, without ever seeing a policy connection. The other problem is keeping 
reserves distinguished from long-term income support via the surpluses route. 
I have long approved of income support as a way of assisting farmers' 
adjustments. I now consider that adjustment period for commercial farmers to 
be finished. I would confine income support to such eventualities as a very 
rough cost-price squeeze brought on by a sustained period of rapid inflation 
or by a collapse of our export markets. Direct payments and even production 
controls ought to be kept on the back burner for such eventuali tie,S -- since 
the future is unpredictable -- but I would hope that they receive little 
future use. 
Since this Administration has ended the long term attempts to subsidize 
farmers' incomes, it is also time to end the various programs for subsidizing 
their competition. I speak of the various tax shelters which have brought 
hundreds of millions of dollars into the livestock and poultry business, into 
orchard development, and even into crop land ownership. These tax shelters 
are a terribly uneconomic use of resources and they are unfair to competing 
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farmers and to other unsheltered taxpayers. I wish that the Secretary of 
Agriculture showed as much interest in freeing Wall street Cowboys from 
government subsidies as he does in freeing farmers. 
Long-term trading agreements have been much in the news. We now have 
agreements with Japan, the USSR and Poland. It appears almost inevitable 
that we will have more such agreements, because they are considered important 
by the governments concerned. 
My feelings about the negotiation of long-term trading agreements with 
major customers are fairly tentative. The agreements deal only with quan-
tities while prices will be determined later in the market. The agreements 
specify a minimal annual quantity that the customer will guarantee to buy 
and that we will guarantee to supply. P.resumably the quantities specified 
are major fractions of the normally expected sales volume. Prices will 
fluctuate. When world crops are good, importers will get cheap grain but 
we will have a market. When world crops are bad, we are still in a position 
to pull down our stocks and sell them for every cent that the market will 
bear. It would be easy to overemphasize the impacts of such agreements. I 
don't consider this type of agreement as a significant infringement on free 
markets. Marketing agreements of a similar nature between individuals are 
fairly common in the United States. Our commitments to supply minimum 
quantities, however, must be respected, and that could be very inconvenient 
in bad crop years if we don't have any reserves. Such agreements give our 
farmers and government a bit more assurance as to our market demands and 
should reduce some of the annual boom and bust of trade. Moreover, in a 
world where we have much better relations with some nations than others, a 
public set of mutual obligations should help all nations to understand much 
of what we are going to do with our food supplies. 
I re-emphasize that food trade is a part of our foreign policy. Farmers 
would like food trade to be managed so as to maximize their incomes. Church 
groups would like food to be used in a humanitarian and totally non-political 
fashion. Both of those goals deserve respect, but neither has much chance of 
alone controlling food trade policy. 
These suggestions are hardly profound. My aim is not to be profound --
it is rather to avoid policies which within two or three years will be utter 
nonsense. Policy recommendations made a few years ago by most of us are 
irrelevant today because they envisaged a world that no longer exists. Like-
wise, it is distressingly clear that many people, even yet, have no real-
ization of what has happened to us. I read recently on the editorial pages 
of a prominent agribusiness trade magazine evidence to that point. The 
writer clearly considered the farm income jump of the past three years to 
have occurred because we had cast off price supports and developed a great 
world market for our products. Such total confusion of cause and effect 
would be laughable, except as it leads to still more policy confusion. 
It would be foolish for me to assert that these farm policies would meet 
every eventuality. As suggested before, agriculture is now so much a part 
of the whole economy that it is affected less by agricultural policy than by 
a set of events and policies outside agriculture. For example, it is terribly 
important to both food producers and consumers as to what ha.ppens with respect 
to inflation, energy, the avoidance of another 1929 financial crisis, inter-
national finance and trade policies, detente, and social order and stability. 
Also quite relevant to farmers iswhatha.ppens inrural·· America . as to employ-
ment, incomes, and levels of living. Likewise, there are problems of land-· 
use and agricultural labor which are likely to grow more important to farmers. 
In conclusion, I return to my first themes. There is little evidence 
that we can predict accurately the future course of our world markets and 
therefore of our agriculture. Nevertheless, I believe that there are policy 
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steps which we can take which will make the future more livable for all of 
us -- farmers and consumers alike. 
CONSUMERS AND THEIR INTERESTS 
AS INFLUENCES IN MAKING FOOD POLICY 
Kay P achtner 
Executive Director of Consumer Action 
San Francisco, California 
In the past year Consumer Action developed a Food Task Force with the 
monumental job of determining what directions consumer activists should take 
in the area of food policy and reform. 
The first thing we discovered is that significant changes are going on 
in peoples' attitude toward the food industry, in the San Francisco Bay Area 
and allover the country. Shoppers are not just munching away on their 
Pringles while prices rise to even more astronomical levels. They are eating 
less elaborately prepared food, and less meat. Even more important, they are 
speculating why food prices are soaring to such unprecedented levels. And 
their speculations are becoming pretty sophisticated. 
A few months ago, Consumer Action surveyed its members and the public in 
general on food issues, asking among other questions, . "Who do you feel is 
responsible for rising prices?" Out of the 448 responses we received: 
Only 4% blamed farmers 
66% blamed middlemen 
60% blamed monopoly in the food industry 
51% blamed food industry advertising 
35% blamed labor costs. 
Pinning the blame for high prices is one thing~ but how can consumers 
start to bring them down? What better place to start than right on our own 
doorstep -- with the Golden State's $20 billion agribusiness industry. 
As you are aware, California produces 25 percent of our nation's table 
foods, including one third of our canned and frozen fruit and vegetables, and 
is the single largest producer of over 50 of the 200 common crop varieties 
in the United States. Agribusiness is our top industry: it is of vital 
concern to every consumer in our state. Yet how much influence do ordinary 
people have over what food shall be produced, how it shall be advertised and 
marketed, and at what price? Just about as much influence as we have over 
what goes on in the Pentagon! Which is to say, practically none. 
But that is changing. 
Pursuit of profit in this country, the socially accepted game which 
individuals as well as corporations play, has led our food economy into at 
least three major absurdities on this eve of our bicentennial year. 
First and most obvious to all of us, corporate farmers are increasingly 
taking over California's, and the nation's, agriculture and are driving small 
independent farmers off the land. This is the case even though the giants 
are often less efficient. 
In the Golden State, we found that about 6.1 million acres of cropland 
out of a total 11.8 million are owned by corporate farms. And only 45 farms, 
less than 1/10 of 1 percent of the total, control 3.7 million acres, or 61 
percent of the land surveyed. The old-style farmer is going, in fact is al-
most gone -- g:>ne, we suspect -- into the Mar lboro Country commercial. In his 
place is Del Monte, Tenneco, Foremost-McKesson, Norton Simon, Safeway, Gallo, 
Sunkist, and Carnation. You can bet your life that they will not sit up 
nights with the company cow. 
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That's absurdity number one. Number two is a food economy which permits 
farmers in Los Angeles county and New York City to order milk dumped down the 
sewers while ordinary people go hungry -- people in the ghettos, on the 
reservations, the unemployed, the elderly holed up in lonely rooms. It is 
not only absurd, it is tragic. And it produces in the ordinary citizen a 
sense of moral outrage which might surprise farmers and agribusinessmen for 
whom this is common practice. 
Absurdity number three is the national scandal of our eating habits. 
Nutrition education, which we are supposed to get at home but can't, is our 
Little Orphan Annie neglected alike in Washington and on Madison Avenue. 
Most of us eat what we see advertised, particularly on T.V. And what do we 
see? Half the time it is junk. About half the some $3.5 billion spent on 
food and beverage advertising in this country is devoted to empty calories. 
Apparently, the more the processing of food the higher the profits but not 
the better the nutrition. 
And what happens? We fatten ourselves on booze, snacks, and sugary, 
fatty or otherwise unsuitable foods. Our waistlines thicken, our teeth rot, 
our arteries clog, and our blood sugar rises to dangerous levels. At the 
same time we deplete our nation's limited energy and other resources. 
At Consumer Action, we have worked out, we think, four very important 
principles which could transform our food economy, and put an end to these 
absurdities. 
First, we believe that corporate concentration has grown to an extent 
where the myth of the free enterpr ise system is displayed in full relief. 
It is exposed, and it will be stopped. 
Second, since we believe that the food economy is too important to be 
left to the jolly green giants we contend that control must be shared with 
consumers and workers. This is particularly true of control over the regula-
tory process which is presently more concerned with maintaining agribusiness 
profits than in giving shoppers a fair deal. 
Thirdly, we believe in the ideal of Lifeline Foods -- nutritious foods, 
preferably whole foods, which are readily available to everybody at minimum 
fixed cost. It is, or should be, the right of every man, woman and child in 
this country, no matter what his or her economic means, to eat nutritional 
food. 
Fourth, we believe that a concerted effort must be made at all levels to 
reduce waste. The effort would start at the farm, then lead to alternative 
methods of food distribution~ 
When I talk about "we," I am of course referr ing principally to Consumer 
Action. But I should make it clear that these principles are shared by other 
local, and national, consumer organizations. At the national level, they are 
shared by the Consumer Federation of America, the largest consumer group in 
the country, specifically its Food Policy Committee of which I am presently 
chairperson. In California these ideals are also shared by such groups as 
the Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley, and the California Citizens' Action 
Group. 
At Consumer Action, we feel that the best way to start tackling the 
mammoth problem of corporate concentration is to expose it. Early in 1976 
we shall be publishing an Agribusiness Directory, authored by Al Krebs, 
formally of the Agribusiness Accountability Project. This will document the 
agribusiness interests of the 126 largest U.S. corporations, and will show 
that large corporate domination of agribusiness is increasing at an alarming 
rate, particularly among banks and oil and insurance companies. 
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The Directory also pinpoints tremendous gaps in our knowledge about the 
operation of these multinational conglomerates. There is no doubt that we 
need complete "line of business" financial disclosure. Also disclosure of 
all private-label production 7 of corporations' ownership and leasing of 
agricultural land7 of all their subsidiaries 7 of all their federal and state 
income tax returns7 of all their advertising expenditures, by division and 
product line7 of all their nutritional and environmental impact research. 
In addition to disclosure, we support the concept of family farm acts 
which would prohibit large-scale corporate involvement in agriculture, pre-
serve the family farm, and save what is left of traditional rural life in 
America. And finally, we support tax reform which would preclude tax loss 
farming and farm tax shelters. 
Meanwhile, what can consumers do to protect themselves from the crushing 
weight of corporate concentration? Perhaps we are being over-optimistic, but 
we believe individuals can help themselves save money and get satisfaction 
when they have been cheated simply by being aware of their rights -- their 
rights to information, to clean and safe food, and to honest sales transac-
tions. More importantly, they can organize to negotiate with industry and 
government. 
Next year we plan to publish another book, "Eater's Rights." It will 
answer peoples' basic questions about food, shopping, food programs, and 
dining out. It is being written by Jennifer Cross, author of the successful 
book, liThe Supermarket ' Trap. II 
We hope and believe that both these books will be invaluable tools for 
teachers and researchers, as well as the general public. If any of you is 
interested in them, please speak to me afterwards. I will arrange for you 
to be sent further details. 
Of course, all the rights and all the information in the world will not 
change the harsh fact that the balance of power is not on consumers' side. 
For this reason Consumer Action and other consumer groups are attempting to 
change state regulation of agriculture to bring more equity to consumers, 
workers, and constituents. I am particularly referring to the 36 marketing 
order boards which regulate the quantity, quality, advertising and research 
of some very basic food commodities. 
In the first place, we suggest that each board have a majority of public 
members, instead of one token public member as at present, and that the 
public members be given a budget and staff to develop their own independent 
research, programs, and recommendations. 
Second, we are protesting the boards' misuse of advertising, promotion, 
and research money. Why should the California Milk Board send market 
researchers to peoples' homes to paw through their refrigerators, then spend 
$8 million a year in advertising reminding us that "everybody needs milk"? 
True, milk is a good food, and we would prefer to see ads for this than for 
Coca-Cola, but why not simply reduce prices? 
Or why not require that a certain percentage of boards' -- and companies' 
advertising budgets be devoted to nutrition education? 
Untold millions of dollars are al.so spent by the marketing boards -- not 
to mention universities, land grant colleges, and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture -- on agricultural research. And what do consumers get for it? 
Among other things we get hard tomatoes, hard times. Red, waxy love- apples 
which taste o.f plastic, and are so low-acid they do not can properly. That 
abortion of food technology, Pringles. Fruits and vegetables which can be 
machine-picked -- and put the farmworker on the dole. 
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What sort of research would consumers like to see? Research on the 
basic dilemma of how to get nutritious food to market at prices people can 
afford: Research on alternative creative economic systems; research on the 
effects of commodity futures -- their track records; research on the effects 
of imports and exports on food policy; research on land use programs. 
Our third complaint against present governmental policy is waste. The 
routine destruction of good food and the tactics used to withhold it from the 
domestic market result in higher profits for the producer and inflated prices 
for consumers. An example is the California Egg Board, which arranged for 
the slaughter of 10 percent of the state's egg-laying chicken flock, and then 
diverted another 12.5 percent of the egg production overseas. And the Turkey 
Industry Advisory Board, which permitted a 10 percent cutback in turkey 
production this year, leading to a 6-10 cents per pound price hike at Thanks-
giving. And the cranberry set-asides, the green drops, the tree pulls, all 
of which result in higher prices for many popular fruits. 
We are also protesting the misuse of quality standards by the marketing 
order boards, which are deliberately imposed and adjusted in the interests of 
producer profit -- in short, a concealed form of quantity control. We 
believe it is wrong to raise or lower quality standards during the growing 
season depending on the size of the crop, leaving consumers little or no 
alternative to the high-priced waxy-looking fruit and vegetables which are 
more beautiful, more expensive, but certainly no more nutritious than the 
lower-grade produce, with its surface defects, which never reaches the super-
market. 
Already, the Berkeley Consumers Cooperative has conducted several experi-
ments with getting certain marketing orders temporarily suspended, and selling 
slightly lower grade produce at bargain prices. Needless to say, the fruit 
was snapped up as soon as it went on sale, while a follow-up survey showed 
that people do prefer lower prices even with cosmetic defects. 
More basically, we suggest that less rigid quality standards be adopted 
for example, the 10-90 standard, which ensures that no more than 10 percent 
of the produce have a couple of surface defects. 
Equally essential are new, low-cost alternatives to traditional grocery 
marketing. Supermarkets have become too big for their own boots. They are 
too big to sell at maximum efficiency and minimum price. Yet supermarket 
profits are rising. So are manufacturers' profits, particularly profits of 
companies in canning, milling, sugar, soybeans, and TVP. 
Right now, it is the small entrepreneur who is bearing the brunt of 
experimenting with new, cheaper ways of doing business. It was the Berkeley 
Coop, too small technically to be considered a supermarket chain, which got a 
handful of marketing orders suspended and sold cheap produce. It is the 
ordinary Californian who bands together in tiny food conspiracies, coopera-
tives and buying clubs, buying direct from the farmer or wholesaler to bring 
prices down. It is the ordinary San Franciscan who digs up his backyard or 
corner lot to start a community garden. These people need help. They need 
research help, money, tax incentives. They also need the suspension of rules 
and regulations, those of labor as well as government and business, which 
work in favor of the jolly green giants and make ours a closed enterprise 
system. 
I would like to conclude with an appeal and a challenge. This country 
desperately needs a rational food policy, one which sees that people are fed, 
that individual farmers are kept on the land, and that keeps profit-greedy 
monopolies in check. As agricultural econom~ts, whose side are you on? 
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We need your support in attacking the sanctity of marketing orders and 
price-fixing arrangements of all kinds. We need your help in devising ways 
to reduce waste, get better tasting and more nutritious foods, and bring 
about a more efficient delivery system. Are you presently engaged in research 
which contributes to this? Or are you working on more hard tomatoes, and 
more profits for the giant corporations? 
Are you teaching your students to perpetuate the same old system? Are 
you giving them projects which are little better than academic papershuffling? 
Or are you exposing them to the political realities of our closed enterprise 
system and corporate socialism, and then giving them the green light to make 
what changes they can? Above all, are you teaching them that food should be 
for people, not for profit? I hope so! 
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THE CONTEMPORARY SETTING FOR MAKING FOOD POLICY 
Francis A. Kutish 
Staff Assistant, Office of Neal Smith 
U. S. Congress 
We're meeting here at a special time. Our nation has just had a record 
production year for grain and fiber crops. The success with which American 
farmers have been able to produce has become important to a wide range of 
people. It's been an aid in reducing world tension and certainly a big help 
to our country in earning foreign exchange. 
Record farm output has been the result, I believe, first, of highly 
trained farmers7 second, of the great natural resources we havei third, of 
an abundance of technologY7 and fourth, of price incentives which encouraged 
farmers to go ahead and produce. 
I think we clearly are entering a new era for agriculture. It is an era 
that contains some good things and some not so good. We have huge exports of 
food, giving us about a $12 billion agricultural trade surplus. At the same 
time we have higher costs, particularly those related to energy -- for all 
types of energy including motorized energy and the energy used in nitrogen 
fertilizer. 
In the farm legislation area there are some serious weaknesses. Much of 
our current farm legislation is out of touch with current economic conditions 
and particularly rising costs. The level of price supports is far below 
current market prices. Support for wheat is $1.37 a bushel. If prices were 
to fall to that level some farmers would face bankruptcy. 
A big crop could in fact wreak havoc with a good many producers. In 1975 
we were lucky that our big crops coincided with a bad year in Russia. Should 
our farmers have to depend on other nations' misfortunes for their prices and 
income? To reverse the phrasing, with prices of farm products subject to ups 
and downs, should grain, poultry, and livestock producers have greater assur-
ance that their hard work will be rewarded in the market place? 
Across the top of the national archives in Washington is engraved the 
saying: liThe past is prologue to the future. Study the past. II We don't 
abruptly change from the past, and this is good. Farmers have made many long-
term investments on the basis of past national farm policies. An abrupt 
change could cause some rather serious financial problems. 
The history of political action relating to agriculture goes back a long 
ways. We have had so-called "action programs" in agriculture for 42 years. 
Before 1933, we had programs which dealt indirectly with agriculture. In 
fact, one could start with the Homestead Act, which had a two-fold purpose: 
to colonize the West and to provide cheap land for those farmers who had sold 
their land in the East and wanted to move on. The Granger laws came near the 
turn of the century, protecting farmers and others from the railroads and 
other monopolies of those days. During and right after World War I, agricul-
tural policy was based on the hope that if farmers could just increase their 
output and raise their efficiency, they'd be able to make a profit. 
But the late 1920s began to cast doubts upon this philosophy, and with 
the collapse of the domestic and foreign markets in 1933 agriculture turned 
to the so-called action programs. These entered farm policy in the political 
arena. As a by-product of the new farm programs, the Secretary of Agriculture 
became more farm-oriented. The AAA community committees were set up and our 
administrative leaders began to come from the farm sector whereas previously 
they had been mostly from the political sector. Farmers became Assistant 
Secretaries of Agriculture, and Under Secretary. Secretary Claude Wickard 
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was a farmer. More recently, as action programs eased, leaders of the Depart-
ment bf Agriculture began to come from agribusiness, state governments, and 
the universities. 
Let1s consider some of the basic political science philosophy relating 
to agriculture. I can remember a course in Political Science that I took at 
Iowa State College, in which the professor said on the first day, "Ilm going 
to give you a definition of the course. Politics is the art of compromise 
sometimes called the art of the possible. II The art of compromise referred to 
political compromise. 
Let me illustrate. An energy bill has been kicking around in the Congress 
a considerable time. People wonder why it is that it is so hard to come up 
with energy legislation. Think a minute. If you are a Congressman from an 
oil district of Oklahoma or Texas, the interests of your people cannot possibly 
be the same as those of Massachusetts or New York where everyone is an oil 
user. A Congressman who comes from the southeastern part of the United States 
where refineries are based upon the importation of foreign crude oil, does not 
see eye-to-eye with a Congressman whose district refines domestic crude. Or 
take Congressional districts in the shipping and receiving ends of a pipeline, 
the West Coast and Upper Midwest -- here too are philosophies found that are 
different from those in the Southwest and Southeast. All these differences 
impinge on energy legislation. The Congress has been searching for a way to 
bring these various interests together into a national energy bill. 
There are similar conflicts of interest with respect to food policy. 
Producers have different interests than processors. Even within agriculture 
there are differences in interests. 
Secondly, fewer Congressmen now have a sizable rural constituency. If 
all Congressmen with a majority rural constituency were to get together in a 
room they could not carry through any kind of a food policy by themselves. 
The only way they could do it would be by teaming with other Congressmen from 
other areas. So the Congressmen from rural districts have to work with others, 
with the labor spokesmen and the city Congressmen. Again this becomes a 
matter of the art of compromise, or the art of the possible. 
The third thing we need to consider is the image of the Congress as an 
institution, why it is slow and seems to struggle so much. I worked in the 
Executive Branch for awhile. There one makes decisions under statutes which 
set the boundaries within which the agency operates. Furthermore, the politi-
cal aspects of agency decisions have been defined pretty well in the White 
House. The boundaries for action by the federal Congress, or by state legis-
latures, are different. The parameter here is the Constitution, which gives 
a much broader range of possibilities. This range is complicated by the con-
flicting interests of constituencies, as I pointed out earlier. The decisions 
are worked on and hammered out within this broader framework. It takes much 
longer to frame new legislation than for an administrator to decide how to 
administer a particular law. This is the reason why Congress and the state 
legislatures at times appear to be slow and fumbling. 
Now, letls return to farm legislation. Our farm legislation of the 1930s 
and 1940s, which is still the basic agricultural law" had several goals. One 
was to raise farm income and reduce its variability. Another was to preserve 
and strengthen the family farm. A third was to conserve the soil. Another 
was to meet the food needs of the consuming population. In the Acts of 1938 
and 1949 we find these goals in the preamble or statement of purpose. They 
were not hard to agree on. It was assumed that we could enhance farmers' 
income by strengthening the price of commodities or making direct payments. 
In turn the farm family security would be improved. Since farmers then were 
virtually all family farmers, if we did this we would help family farmers 
which is to say, everybody in farming. We also had some special aids for the 
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smaller farms: a minimum allotment and extra program payment for small farms. 
Later, there were payment limitations. 
Everyone was for the soil conservation goal. There were conserving bases 
for farms, ACP payments, and such. 
As far as consumer interests were concerned, these were recognized in the 
laws in order to get the support of the city folks for their passage. The 
authors of the laws were not vitally concerned, however, about consumers --
and as soon as a law was passed, consumers' interests were largely disregarded. 
But in fact, the programs inadvertently served consumers quite well. There 
was the stabilizing effect of the grain stocks. As acreage controls failed 
to restrain production very much, a plentiful grain and livestock supply was 
the order of the day. Academicians here at Missouri and Iowa State and other 
universities wrote that the farm programs really helped consumers as much as 
farmers -- but few persons in the cities believed them. Nevertheless, the 
actual operations of the programs through this period did serve the consumers 
quite well by stabilizing food costs. 
Writing a bill in those days was easier than now because consumers did 
not feel their interests to be threatened, since food prices were relatively 
stable. The main farm legislative question really was which commodity or 
regional farm interest was going to get the best of the deal. How were you 
to divide the benefits? Here cotton usually came out on top. Cotton took 
the farm legislation leadership. Legislation could not be enacted without 
cotton leadership and support, and the hardest bargains were struck by cotton 
as a price of their leadership. 
This now seems ancient history as we view the contemporary 1975 setting 
for making food policy. The world food situation of 1972-75 eliminated stocks. 
World reserves are minimal, prices for farm products are up. The energy 
crisis has fed inflation, including inflation of farm costs. 
But even though farm incomes as a whole have been good the last few years, 
certain segments of agriculture have not shared equally in all the gains. 
Sometimes we talk about farmers and agriculture as though they were a mono-
lithic unit. Actually there are many different farm interests and each 
vibrates on a different wavelength. The broiler producers who depend entirely 
on shipped-in grai~ the dairy farmers of Pennsylvania and New York, 
the cattle feeders in the commercial feedlots who likewise buy grain, and the 
cow and the calf man who produces feeder cattle -- these people, all of them, 
have not shared the same benefits the last few years as the man who produces 
corn or soybeans. 
And so the answer to the question of what's good for agriculture depends 
somewhat upon where -- in which agricultural area, which Congressional 
district -- the question is asked. Some of the loudest cries for embargos on 
grain exports came from broiler and dairy producers. 
Nor dare we forget that grain farmers themselves still face uncertainties. 
Even though the supply-demand balance may tip less toward surpluses' than it 
did five years ago, I wonder if three poor crops worldwide in four years is 
normal. Export markets are likely to remain stronger than before, but levels 
of the past year or two are not guaranteed. 
Our exports are up for three reasons: more world affluence; political 
changes in both the Iron Curtain countries and China; and bad weather. The 
third should not be overlooked. I am convinced that big yields in some crop 
years can still break grain prices and that 1w::> million U.S. farmers as indivi-
duals cannot regulate their production and manage their reserves by themselves. 
If we were to have a shortage of grain production once every three years, 
grain prices would have to rise by 50 percent in order to cover all carrying 
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costs for storage. This means that we would have either a 50 percent increase 
in the general average of grain prices every three years, which can only 
happen with strong inflation, or we would experience highly unstable grain 
prices. 
Some new elements are entering the farm legislation picture. It is 
hardly news that the environmentalists have entered it. As food costs rose 
consumers became more vocal, as everyone knows. George Meany had a 
ship-loading strike, and an AFL-CIO resolution said that farm programs should 
help to hold down food prices. 
Farm incomes have gone up and the structure of farming has changed from 
what it was 30 years ago. Currently, 47 percent of all farm production is 
produced by farms of over $100,000 sales. This does not conjure up family 
farms in the eyes of many people in the city. 
A redefinition of farms will chop off the bottom 440,000 units, further 
reducing the national image of the family farm. Recently, I was told about 
a case where a member of Iowa State University was hired away for three-
fourths of his time by a farmer to help manage his farm business. If a farmer 
can outbid a university for a staff member, this again raises questions about 
the image of farmers compared with what it was 20 or 30 years ago. 
Furthermore, there is less unity among farm groups now. Dairymen and 
pou~trymen do not have the same sympathy with high feed prices as grain pro-
ducers do and they view with alarm the failure to have more stability in 
supply. Hog producers in the midwest are largely grain producers as well and 
they probably have more interest in grain policy than in hog production. 
Cattle ranchers never did see any connection between the feed grain program 
and their interests. Cattle feeders, particularly the big feedlots, do not 
have enough political clout to affect grain policy. Midwest cattle feeders 
are usually corn farmers first and cattle feeders second. 
So the situation still exists that unless cotton sees something for 
itself in legislation, nothing much will happen. It is significant that no 
farm legislatiOn could be passed in the first year of this session of Congress 
until the dairy and cotton interests got their particular wishes written into 
the program. These were the two items on which the President based his veto, 
and the two items that were used most in the ensuing debate to support the 
veto. The cotton item called for raising the cotton loan above the market 
price of cotton at that particular time, and so it negated the argument that 
the farm program wouldn't raise costs. Increasing the dairy product price 
supports ran into the snaffu connected with disclosures of political contribu-
tions by dairy organizations, as well as the likelihood that it would add to 
food costs. 
In many ways today's farm problems are regionalized. Most of our small 
commercial farms stretch across the northern and southern heartland, where 
regional interests center in grain, dairy, cotton, and peanuts. When cattle 
are in trouble its center is the West. Here in the Midwest farming is parti-
cularly diverse. There are corn, soybeans, hogs, and cattle and many farmers 
have their feet in more than one commodity camp. They find it hard to come 
up with a common farm policy front. The more specialized producers of cotton, 
peanuts, and rice have less difficulty in deciding on their policy wishes. 
Cotton may have another 10 years or so as a major force to be reckoned with 
simply because it has so many Congressmen and Senators from its producing 
region. . 
The kind of farm law enacted to replace the 1973 act will be affected by 
the kind of farming year 1976 proves to be. If we have a big crop with poor 
markets, and surpluses result, there will be more concern about supports. If 
the 1976 crop is on the short side, with good prices and no need for support, 
the environment will favor less of an action-type program. 
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We could well have a collection of commodity bills. One of these would 
contain something for cotton. Politically cotton will have to be taken care 
of. Even so, to get any kind of bill passed some accommodation will be neces-
sary with consumers, and with labor, processors, and exporters. In this regard 
farmers, rather than commiting themselves on the one side to labor or on the 
other side to business, might strategically play more of a go-between role --
that is, they might try to maintain relations with both and not become signed 
up on either side. This would fit with the definition that politics is the 
art of compromise -- the art of the possible. If farmers are going to take 
an all-or-nothing attitude that what they want is "right" and should be passed, 
they will not be recognizing how the political world works. If farm groups 
are going to work with other people, they must know them, and understand their 
problems -- just as they expect others to understand their own problems. 
Not long ago a Congressman from an agricultural district voted for a bill 
that might have been called a IIlaborll bill. He got all kinds of flack from 
some of his constituents. Later on, when the. farm bill came up, the author of 
the labor bill voted with the farm district congressman for the farm bill. This 
went unrecognized in his agricultural district. The legislative process 
cannot be a one-way street. Although people ought not compromise their basic 
concepts, it often is possible to have an understanding of the other fellow's 
problems and say, IILook, I'll help you out. Let's set up a little credit for 
my legislation, when I need your vote." 
Thus, in our contemporary setting it is necessary to look at problems 
from various viewpoints. We cannot spend all of our time trying to educate 
the other person, but must also spend a little time trying to understand the 
other person's problems too. If we are going to work with people we must 
know them, we must understand them, as well as expect them to know us and 
understand us. 
Remember, politics is the art of compromise. We do not compromise our 
basic rights, of course, but we do look for an area of common understanding. 
If we do this I think we can come up with a farm program in 1976 that will 
suit us pretty well. If we do not -- if we insist on all or nothing -- it 
will likely be mostly nothing. 
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A RECONCILIATION OF NATIONAL GOALS FOR FOOD AND 
THE ASPIRATIONS , OF FARMERS AND RURAL PEOPLE 
Harold F. Breimyer 
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Economics and Extension Economist 
University of Missouri, Columbia 
"There are today no leaders, only heads of factions~ 
there is no leadership of ideas, only a competition of 
ideo log ies ~ there is no consensus • . • • II 1 
--Benjamin Barber 
liThe legal order, after all, is an accommodation. It 
cannot sustain the continuous assault of moral imPiratives." 
--Alexander M. Bickel 
Search for a national food policy leads directly to the puzzling 
question of how the policy making process works. It seems strange, but no 
part of the food policy scene is more bewildering. We have some understanding 
about farm costs, foreign trade, farm income, and even consumers' wishes. 
But when we turn to the process by which the parts are put together we become 
insecure. 
Americans may be naive about political procedure. As a possible cause, 
during most of our national life the role of government has been downplayed. 
We have told ourselves how much we wish to keep government subordinate. What 
is not emphasized need not be examined. 
The reality may contradict the rhetoric. Even as we advertise our open 
economy we extend the regulatory arm into more parts of it. Even as we seek 
to minimize governmental involvement we direct more problems government's way. 
We deplore but we do not retrench. Nor, despite election-year postures, will 
the situation soon change. 
An active role for government will continue for one simple reason: the 
problems that lead to that role have not been resolved, nor have they oblig-
ingly disappeared. Energy, world food, inflation/unemployment, resource 
depletion -- all persist. They inescapably involve the democratic process of 
government. 
This brief paper can touch only lightly on the policy making process. 
It begins with my widely-shared judgment of the low present state of public 
confidence. A resume of some of my ideas will be presented. Final pages sum 
up the immediate prospects for policy. 
My sombre assessment of the present situation coincides with that of 
Benjamin Barber, quoted above and on page 40. Surely our national record of 
the last decade, from vietnam to Watergate to non-policy on oil, gives no 
cause for comfort. Those events are not merely an accident of personalities. 
The greatest danger is that we become so discouraged we stop trying. 
When Henry Ruth, Jr., retired as Special Prosecutor he cited the danger of a 
backlash of distrust in government: "You should be skeptical, but a 
lBenjamin Barber, "Command Performance, II Harper's, April 1975, pp. 51-56. 
2Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent, quoted in Robert L. 
Bartley, liThe Wisdom of Alex Bickel, II Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1975. 
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cynicism that turns people totally away from their government is what creates 
watergates. 1I3 
As a starting point, let it be emphasized that no nation can devise 
political procedures that will work unless there is first a solid base of 
consensus. Moral consensus, if you please. This is what Bickel means when 
he writes, in the quotation above, that the legal order can do no more than 
accommodate a · nation's moral imperatives. He adds, IIWhat is above all impor-
tant is consent -- not a presumed theoretical consent but a continuous actual 
responsiveness. II 
Other distinguished minds have echoed the principle. Walter Lippmann 
wrote 46 years ago that man has never been able to find a sUbstitute for 
IIthose accumulated conv!ctions ll which IIgave him dignity because he was part 
of some greater whole. 1I William Shannon affirms, IIDemocracy depends upon 
commonly held moral attitudes, ••. upon a loyalty to the community, a 
loyalty that renounces violence and reaches beyond self-interest. 1I5 
It may be that we Americans dodge the call for consensus because we put 
so much faith in process, in procedure. We build enormous business and 
governmental organizations, computerized to the hilt. In Columbia we seem to 
vote on some issue or elect some official each month. We even punch holes in 
cards instead of marking a ballot. Yet Bickel warns against trusting the 
infallibility of majority vote. liThe people are something else than a 
majority registered on election day. II 
A Pyramidal Structure of Compromise 
Even though policy begins with consensus for unity, the remarks that 
follow relate to process. What indeed is the nature of the policy making 
process? 
My interpretation is that it is an exercise in compromise -- within, of 
course, the bounds of the agreed-on consensus. It is a sequence of compro-
mise; more exactly stated, it is a vertical sequence of lateral compromises. 
In the sense used here, the idea of compromise is solely lateral. It applies 
only to negotiation and reconciliation at similar strata in an organizational 
system. 
Diagram of Compromise Pyramid 
3Quoted in Los Angeles Times, October 17, 1975. 
4Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Morals. Quoted by Smith Hemps tone , 
syndicated column of September 14, 1975. 
5Wi11iam Shannon, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 10, 1975. 
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The diagram above illustrates. Among units at each organizational level 
there is lateral negotiation working toward compromise. At each echelon above 
the lowest, however, there is a second connection, with lower and higher units. 
The highest administrative unit has the ultimate responsibility for the entire 
organization. 
Naturally, one might say! How else? This explanation seems so ordi-
nary, so familiar. 
It is of course not original. But neither is it as familiar as it 
seems, or universally accepted. 
Other Organizational Systems 
It may be helpful to consider what this system is not. It is not 
authoritarian. It is not based on decree from above. On the contrary, it 
permits working out agreements laterally without requiring approval, or even 
enforcement, from a higher echelon. It fits the principle that we endorse so 
freely, decentralization. 
The system is not even the same as the organization chart that is 
described so often for a big corporation or for government. The customary 
chart only shows diagonal lines without the elaborate network of lateral 
communication. It does not tell the full story. 
The system as described here is nearly the same as the cooperation that 
Don Paarlberg calls the best among four possible systems. Referring to 
"strategies" for policy in the "new agenda, II he names four possibilities: 
hallucination, confrontation, capitulation, and cooperation. In advocating 
cooperation Paarlberg goes to some length to reject the second, confrontation. 
It leads to power struggles, he says, and threatens deadlock as each party 
finds it difficult to retreat with honor. 6 
Compromise resembles cooperation and, like it, differs from confronta-
tion in that each party must accept less than what is sought. Each must give 
up something. In an aura of compromise there can be no total victories. 
Compromise is limited in participants and scope. It can reach only a 
certain number of parties. And the give and take for compromise can encom-
pass only a certain range of factors that bear on a situation. 
And above all, a compromise system requires that all parties accept a 
universal consensus of purpose and carryon lateral negotiation within it. 
6non Paarlberg, liThe Farm Policy Agenda, II address at National Public 
Policy Education Conference, September 11, 1975, USDA 2621-75. 
Further from Benjamin Barber: 
IIDemocratic leadership • • • ar ises • • • out of great 
purposes -- a delicate consensus tenable only when the 
polity is able to define common goals. II 
liThe failure of leadership which endangers our democracy is 
a failure of national will, a failure of public standards. I~ 
lilt is no good for us to go looking for leaders~ we must 
first rediscover citizens. II 
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This proviso leads us to consider the pyramidal nature of the system, 
shown clearly in the chart. Higher echelons and their interconnecting lines 
are necessary for three important reasons. The higher units (1) provide 
communication over a wider range than is possible by informal negotiation at 
a single level; (2) stand guard to make sure that lower-level compromises do 
in fact stay within the bounds of the overall consensus; and (3) step in and 
take over where lateral compromise fails at lower levels. 
This is the system. To repeat for clarity: decision-making in a demo-
cracy is a tier of processes. At each level factors are weighed, a compromise 
solicited. There is latitude for resolution at each level. Higher levels 
provide longer-distance communication and enforce conformity to common purpos~ 
but also are the residual authority. 
The system prevails widely. It applies to democratic government .and to 
any large civilian bureaucracy whether a business, a religious denomination, 
a university, or a farmers' organization. 
To say again for emphasis: the diagram of arcs of relationship (page 39), 
which could be elaborated to show feedback loops, is different from the usual 
outline of straight lines of relationship on organization charts. The complex 
curvilinear picture is more accurate. 
A System in Flux 
We can be prideful about our concept of the decision-making process in 
a democracy. We can also be apprehensive, for it is a delicately poised 
process. It is anchored by no absolute center of power, at either the top or 
bottom. It is essentially an unstable system. We make a serious mistake if 
we think it is God-bequeathed for all time. 
The system is suspended midway between two polar opposites, each power-
ful. One is authoritarianism, toward which it is always tugged. The oppo-
site is disorder or even anarchy. The danger never ends of deteriorating 
toward one or the other. We will be fortunate indeed if our nation can 
sustain the kind of gravitational middle ground that has been our good 
fortune for 199 years. 
The system provides a base point for describing national policy-making 
for agriculture and food. My jUdgment, reflecting the apprehensiveness 
confessed above, is that we are moving toward more centralization. Among 
reasons for this trend is the erosion of moral consensus, already referred to. 
Another important reason is that some problems that now face us simply do not 
lend themselves to easy decentralization. Food policy, for example, can 
readily be decentralized when supplies are at that blissful level of adequacy 
without excess. Either a tightness of food supplies or chronic surplus 
invites decision making at higher level. The recent shortage has had that 
effect. 
By way of illustration without pretense of exactness, we could suggest 
that ~n the 1970s to date national policy bearing directly or indirectly on 
food has been dealt with in the Executive Branch about as follows: 
Executive Office of the President 
Cabinet Department (USDA) 
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Energy 
Inflation control 
Unemployment reduction or relief 
International economic relations 
Domestic food programs 
Surplus removal 
Rural development 
Lower jurisdictions Soil conservation practices 
ASC disaster programs, etc. 
Water quality 
Land use 
I have argued for a long time that USDA should be an agency for 
reconciling various and conflicting interests relative to food policy. To 
some extent it does so. But each time the Secretary of Agriculture declares 
that he is the farmers' advocate he abdicates that compromise role, and 
forces decision-making on food upward to the higher level of the Executive 
Office. 7 
The Judicial Counterpart 
One word more should be added about this concept of a pyramidal decision-
making structure. My description thus far has been in terms of the executive 
or administrative function. In our nation, a similar arrangement is found in 
the court and judicial system. 
Basic to all is the Constitution, a fundamental document establishing 
the broadest principles for our national life. It is interpretable by a 
Court system culminating, as we all know, in the Supreme Court. The idea of 
stratified relationship prevails through the legal and Court system. Surely 
a Constitution paramount to all law-making is the most wonderfully distin-
guishing feature of the governmental system of our United States. 
The Legislative Branch of Government 
Manifestly, our federal government has three branches of which the court 
system is one. The branches are separate, different, and unequal. Among the 
three, the executive ranks 10west7 it is subordinate to both the Congress and 
the courts. It is also the most ambiguous of the three branches. Defined as 
the administrative and advisory arm of the federal government, it has 
collected so many duties that it implicitly performs many judicial and 
legislative functions. These come about through administrative rulings. 
But by and large, in my opinion, the executive branch gets these widened 
functions not so much by aggrandizement as by default -- default especially 
of the legislative branch. The Congress is now under fire, and the preserva-
tion of our system of government depends on the capacity of the Congress to 
per form well. 
My interpretation of the present insecurity of the legislative branch is, 
first, that members of the Congress reflect the anchorlessness of their 
constituencies, the American people7 and second, that the legislative branch 
does not conform well to the pyramidal structure that I regard as ideal. The 
Congress is all base and no upsloping peak. It is a huge egalitarian 
assemblage, 100 members in the Senate and 435 in the House~ It has been 
found difficult to superimpose a leadership corps that can bring orderly 
resolution of legislative issues. 
The Congressional representation system violates the pyramid idea in 
another way. It can be couched in the language of the historic debate between 
a federated and a centralized nation. Our history books teach that we rejec-
ted a federation because we tried it and it did not work. So we called 
7Harold F. Breimyer, "The Mission, Mechanics, and Morals of an Economic 
Research Agency," staff conference, ERS, November 28, 1972, University of 
Missouri-Columbia, Department of Agricultural Economics, Paper No. 1972-16. 
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ourselves "United," a nondefinitive adjective. 
Representation in the Congress nevertheless still resembles a federation. 
Fifty constituent entities send their delegates to make policies to 
bind them together. If the states· were sUb-units in a single giant pyramid 
the situation might not be so bad. But is seems as though we have 50 
different pyramids, loosely bound together. 
States do not generally serve as sub-units in a national system. A 
great deal of our national life, including trade and commerce and the public 
policies that accompany them, do not subdivide according to state lines. In 
this setting our legislative system is proving increasingly inadequate to 
handle issues that are intrinsically national. 
In view of my interpretation, it will surprise no one that I take a dim 
view of steps such as to redistrict according to the numerology of one-man, 
one-vote. The action was harmless and perhaps even mildly beneficial but it 
does not come to grips with how a federated legislative branch can legislate 
for a nation that has become economically and demographically unified. 
National Problem: Inflation 
A few farm groups would still prefer to assert their wishes via confron-
tation, which they assume would be successful. But the compromise approach 
is safer and much more likely to prevail. 
So long as inflation continues and the public remains sensitive to it, 
any policy for agriculture and food will be made within the context of what 
we try to do to arrest inflation. This is a fact. It cannot be dodged. It 
of course denies the farming sector autonomy over supply and price policy for 
farm products and food. 
The more I ponder inflation, the more I recognize three aspects: 
1. Appreciation of asset values. 
2. Current price relationships between inputs and output. 
3. The distress of fixed income recipients. 
The propertied part of agriculture gets a bonanza from asset apprecia-
tion. On the other hand, financial pursuit of escalating asset values keeps 
agriculture strapped for capital funds. In this respect agriculture is no 
different from other enterprises. Also, in agriculture as elsewhere, capital 
investment to acquire assets for an inflation hedge competes with investment 
for current production. Fiscal and monetary policy, about which we hear so 
much as influencing the rate of inflation, now bears heavily on this first 
aspect. In my opinion a tight policy is resisted stoutly because no investor 
wants to accept a turn-around -- to absorb asset depreciation. This is 
really the bullet that no one is willing to bite. Agriculture is deeply 
involved in this aspect of inflation, and it will be treated identically with 
the rest of the economy. 
With regard to current price relationships two points come to mind. One, 
farm products and food are a big enough component of price indexes, and so 
volatile, that they cannot possibly escape attention. Just now, for example, 
there is no chance whatever that any Administration, of either party, would 
call for restrictions on farm production. Support prices and the deficiency 
payment formula might be liberalized as a concession, but nothing more can be 
expected. For now, production control is out of the picture. 
My second point relates to differences in the structure of markets for 
farm products compared with industrial products. Most farm products and some 
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foods (but not all) still are priced in something close to an open market. 
Industrial products, including highly processed foods, are not. The indus-
trial sector is highly concentrated and a very considerable element of power 
enters into its pricing. 
One wonders how long it will be before the American public admits how 
much concentration of economic power exists in the industrial sector and 
indeed in some services also, such as medicine. My own judgment is that 
unless inflation can be held to a single digit, that is, less than 10 percent, 
we will eventually adopt general price and wage controls. We will do so with 
deep regret. 
The question of controls illustrates the political principles advanced 
in this paper. Adoption of controls would mean we cannot tolerate various 
decentralized price decisions -- those of General Motors regarding car prices, 
of Mayor Alioto and the police of San Francisco, of the oil company giants. 
Matching governmentall power against pr ivate power is not what is meant by 
decentralized compromise decision making! That confrontation is centralized. 
Is that where we are headed? 
With regard to the distress faced by families with fixed incomes, my 
only comment is that many live in rural communities and I see no "solution" 
other than grants-in-aid. 
National Problem: Energy 
Are farmers and the food system involved in the energy situation? They 
certainly are! It's a classic contradiction that the food system, primary to 
man's existence, may not get priority access to dwindling energy. 
If farmers and consumers think that plenty of energy will be allotted to 
the food system irrespective of how scarce the energy supply becomes, they 
are just dreaming. 
Like it or not, federal energy policy is now a part of farm and food 
policy. 
Wild maneuvering about energy policy at highest federal level offers a 
clear if discouraging example of conflict between centralized versus decen-
tralized decision making. The Administration is flooding the public with its 
huzzahs about the incontestable merits of the decentralized market system to 
handle old oil and old and new gas, including nonexistent gas. For any 
commodity, the market system.works satisfactorily when supply and demand are 
in reasonable balance. It will not function well during critical shortage. 
It is doubtful that deregulation would direct enough natural gas to 
manufacture of nitrogen fertilizer to sustain our food production. For that 
matter, neither would regulated allocation, unless the food sector activates 
itself politically so as to be a factor in high level decision making. 
Agriculture, Food, and Foreign Affairs 
Much is said nowadays about how U. S. farm and food policy interconnects 
with our nation's foreign policy. Food can be a tactical weapon internation-
ally. This is grim language. For my part, I hope we employ our food capacity 
with discretion. 
I hope to heaven we make no move toward applying triage, the lifeboat 
principle. If we must use the lifeboat analogy, it should not be of a boat 
packed full of people. It must show one end stacked high with humans and 
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the other with first class passengers enjoying the spacious comfort --
switching the metaphor -- of a Boeing 747. Only part of the world is crowded. 
We have to concede that farm interests are not self-determining regarding 
policy for either commercial or concessionary trade in food products. I 
suppose the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture will continue 
to contest for the ear of the President. This is the pyramidal concept 
carried to its ultimate. The Congress may try to throw more weight to the 
Secretary of Agriculture but I doubt any such action would have much effect. 
On the world scene and in the long view, foreign-policy and farm-and-
food interests will ease their conflict for a reason that is not generally 
admitted. It is that the United States will gradually lose its dominant 
position. At the moment we deal from a position of strength internationally, 
flawed only by a dilemma -- really, cold confrontation -- in petroleum. But 
access to various natural resources (not just oil) is reshuffling positions 
world wide, to our disadvantage. The United States is losing some power. 
In the longer view international trade in food will be closely tied to 
that in oil. Just now the party line is to dampen the issue, but I am 
skeptical. The world's big food importers -- our best buyers -- are also the 
big oil importers. The importers' financial dilemma is being eased tempo-
rarily by huge international loans. They are only a stop-gap. I foresee 
serious stringency in financing trade in farm products and food. 
In the language of this paper, this disquieting situation can only be 
handled at the highest decision level of government. 
Consumers and Food Prices 
Although farmers are sensitive to consumers' attitudes, I put this topic 
well down on my list. One reason is that I believe consumer-farmer issues to 
be partly a side effect of other national issues such as inflation and 
foreign trade. In my opinion, consumers are less annoyed than apprehensive. 
They are apprehensive because for years they have been assured of super-abun-
dance of food, and now in the 1970s that confidence has been jarred. 
The easiest way to reduce consumers' alarms would be to accumulate, once 
more, a reserve of feedstuffs and food of significant but not excessive size. 
It is something of a paradox that the same farm interests that take a dim 
view of food reserves are also the most sensitive to consumers' plaints, when 
a modest reserve would nearly restore quiet. 
It would be an achievement if consumers could somehow learn to distin-
guish between those food prices that are closely related to farmers' prices 
and incomes, and those that bear little relation. Foods such as meat, milk, 
and eggs, which are not processed much and have relatively low marketing 
costs, are priced similarly at the farm and at retail. But foods such as 
bread and other baked goods, the cereals, processed fruits and vegetables, 
and nearly all other processed foods are priced almost independently of 
moderate changes in price at the farm. Consumers concerned for prices of 
this second group should look at the marketing system first. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The title to this paper is self-fulfilling. National goals for food and 
the aspirations of farmers and rural people will be reconciled. The question 
is, how and to what outcome? 
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They will be reconciled via the political process. That process, in a 
democracy, is a delicately poised system of decisions most of which are 
arrived at in a hierarchial system of compromises. Higher level decisions 
coordinate lower level ones and ensure that they do not seriously violate the 
common interest. They also take over where lower-level decision making fails. 
The system is always in danger of swinging toward one of the two 
extremes -- authoritarianism or anarchic chaos. Quoted here are the alarms 
of Benjamin Barber about a default of leadership, for which he blames not 
leaders but a public that is losing its sense of common purpose. 
Crucial to the democratic process is an effective legislative process. 
Yet our Congress is internally unwieldy and hamstrung by a representation 
system that leaves the nation politically federated though economically 
unified. 
Even as the political system reveals deficiencies it is being loaded 
with new problems that are not adapted to decentralized compromise. They 
must be dealt with centrally. Among these are inflation, unemployment, and 
depletion of energy and other mineral resources. 
These are so pervasive that they dominate policies for agriculture and 
food. Farmers, like all citizens, fear runaway inflation. Even our present 
half-hearted inflation-control policies bear on agriculture: for the fore-
seeable future they disallow any restriction on farm production. More 
aggressive action against inflation must take into account the essentially 
market-determined pricing in farm products and some foods that contrasts with 
power-centered price making in industry, a number of processed foods, and 
some services. 
Our once resource-rich nation is now feeling the pinch of depletion, 
particularly of energy. Agriculture and the food system will be right in the 
middle of energy policies. Although highly preferential treatment cannot be 
asked, we will be tested to assure that more essential needs, as for manufac-
ture of nitrogen fertilizer, will be met. 
Inescapably, the role to be given farm products and food in our foreign 
affairs is a central-government decision. Food is a strategic commodity, and 
decisions to employ it considerately or exploitively can only be made at 
highest councils. 
On the other hand, in an interesting pairing of issues some of the sting 
can be taken from apprehensions of both our international customers and our 
consumers at home if a satisfactory level of supply can be assured for the 
future. A restocking of reserves would put minds at rest abroad and at home. 
In the language of this paper, it is an example of the kind of higher-level 
decision that allows decentralized decision-making to operate. 
But irrespective of particular instances such as inflation, energy, and 
food reserves, the overriding message is that efficiency of the governmental 
process -- the capacity truly to reconcile diverse interests and arrive at a 
workable compromise -- is an integral part of farm and food policy. However 
deep our regrets, the hard fact is that the instrument of government now 
gives form and direction to our economy. Decentralized decision making is 
still our ideal and it must remain so. But it becomes attainable not 
autonomously but as a compromise process achieved within an overall consensus 
of purpose. Even the market system, the ultimate kind of decentralization, 
is subject to national policy to retain or discard it. 
A nation that has disparaged the governmental role has neglected its 
cultivation. We seek astuteness in so many fields of knowledge; why do we 
stay with hoary tradition in our understanding of government? The plea here 
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is that we put improvement of our capacity for governmental decision making 
high on our policy agenda. It is viewed, however, not solely as organiza-
tional form or even legislative or executive technique. It reaches also to 
expressing cornmon values and goals. Events of our day add to urgency; and 
they culminate in the dire prospect that if democratic procedure proves 
ineffectual, nondemocratic methods will replace it. 
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It is evident from previous presentations that many factors and values 
must be taken into consideration in developing a food policy. However, 
certain ones are critical and inescapable. I should like to lift these up in 
considering the boundaries of our food policy. But, first I wish to make a 
statement about the limitation of world resources. 
Some very intellectual and vocal people have been painting a dismal 
world picture by evoking the population bomb and the limits of the earth in 
terms of space, fossil fuels, minerals, and the fixed level area that is 
suitable for growing crops. Technology is a villain engaged in polluting and 
debasing the natural environment. This is a materialistic, Malthusian picture 
of the earth. It is not in line with economic history. 
Human beings are not robots: nor are they lemmings bent on their own 
destruction. The intelligence and ability of people to perceive and respond 
to changing circumstances holds the key to what lies ahead. Through the use 
of science and technology man will adapt to the changing environment. This 
does not mean we will not have adverse disasters, such as wars, famine, 
atomic accidents, earthquakes, floods, and crop failures. As Dr. T. W. 
Schultz of the University of Chicago says, "It is ironic that economics, the 
dismal science, is now holding out the hope of the future." 
Now let us turn to those items that will put a boundary around our food 
policy: 
1. Dependence on Exports -- No one can deny that we are now geared to large 
exports of feed grains, wheat, soybeans and cotton. The loss of this 
foreign market would have serious consequences to farming in the United 
States. Agriculture would be in serious economic trouble. Therefore, 
we must have a policy that keeps these markets open to us. 
2. World Food Situation -- During the last two or three years most of us 
have attended one or more food policy conferences. They have been of 
two types. In one, the food needs of the world are viewed as though we 
were one great body of people on the earth. Speakers project food needs 
and production and come out that we will have difficulty producing 
enough food for the world during the next decade and longer. 
At the second type of conference speakers look at the world as it 
is organized with some 150 sovereign nations, each jealous of its rights 
and insisting that it controls its own destiny in regard to food as well 
as other policies. I do not believe we can deny that this is the realis-
tic situation. The other approach is true but idealistic. It is like 
showing how much we could save if we were all honest and could remove 
all the locks to our houses and cars. 
It is sort of an unwritten law of Congress, of any Administration 
in the Executive Branch, and of the citizens of this country that if 
there is a natural disaster anywhere in the world, we will send food. 
We have not had very much political discussion of this question. It is 
scarcely questionable or debatable. 
The real issue arises with regard to sending large quantities of 
food on a continuing basis. We all remember that after World War II we 
put a lot of money into Europe and Europe blossomed. Then we said, "We 
will put a lot of food and money into the developing countries, II and we 
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did. But they didn't blossom. We found that if large quantities of 
food are put into a country two reactions follow, one economical and one 
political. The economical one is that if food is coming in any large 
quantity, it lowers the price and discourages the production of food in 
the country receiving it. The political one is that the government of 
the receiving country tends to put a lower priority on food. It seems 
to me that it is the composite opinion of the Western world that it is 
best to supply the developing countries with research and education, to 
aid them in getting the kinds of inputs they need to produce, to help 
with their markets ana pricing systems, and to encourage family planning. 
These would go with a minimum of direct food aid. In other words, we 
teach the people how to fish rather than give them the fish, and they 
will have a fish tomorrow. 
If this situation prevails, then we may have surplus grains in the 
commercial markets as in the past with certain countries short of 
adequate food because they are unwilling or unable to take the necessary 
steps domestically. 
3. Food Supplies Are Increasing -- With recent prices of grains, nearly 
every developed and semi-developed country has been trying to increase 
its production. Had not Russia's crop dropped from the early estimate 
of 210 million tons of grain to around 140 million tons, corn at harvest 
at the farm in the United States would likely have fallen slightly below 
$2.00 per bushel this year. There is much evidence to indicate that 
with average weather in the United States and the world, the capacity of 
the world's commercial agricultural plant will exceed the commercial 
market at prices prevailing this past fall. Two good crops back to back 
could put us in a weak grain price situation, even though we have opened 
up new market outlets and I would expect our exports to grow. 
4. · Annual Weather Not Predictable -- Predicting the weather for a year 
ahead is as yet one of Mother Nature's secrets that we have not unlocked. 
From 100 years of weather records in the United States we do know that 
considering each year as an independent variable as the Weather Bureau 
does, the odds are 3 out of 4 for anyone year that we will have a good 
corn and wheat crop -- one that is not more than 10 percent below 
average. There is a lout of 4 chance that crops will be more than 10 
percent below average. 
Soybeans have 7 out of 8 chances of being not more than 10 percent 
below average, and only 1 chance out of 8 of falling below 90 percent 
of average. 
For the world we have about lout of 4 odds of a seriously short 
crop in any given year, resulting from unfavorable weather. 
S. Odds for Surpluses Greatest -- When all the factors are added up it 
seems to me the odds favor a surplus situation in grains, in terms of 
average prices of the last few years. However, inasmuch ~s.weather is, 
variable, this does not mean that we could not have a def~c~t U.S. gra~n 
situation in certain years. Therefore, our food policy must be prepared 
to cope with both surplus and deficit situations, with the greater 
emphasis on the surplus problem. 
I believe that anyone searching for a food policy must recognize four, 
criteria: (1) maintenance of our foreign exports, (2) allowance for dynam~c 
adjustments in agriculture, (3) protection of agricultural producers from 
disaster prices, and (4) limitation upon excessive exports to centrally 
controlled countries if they are seriously disorganizing the U.S. or world 
market. 
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Some persons would argue that the free market with only minor modifica-
tions has taken care of the situation during the last three years. They also 
believe the free market will most effectively, from the standpoint of every-
one's interests, take care of future situations. 
The objection raised to this approach is that it would allow grain prices 
to fall too low for farmers, and go too high for consumers and the livestock 
industry. 
A second group argues for high price supports, storage, control of output 
as necessary, and limitation on exports in times of short supply. 
The objections to this approach are that it limits our ability to compete 
abroad and eventually would shrink our market. Our experience in cotton and 
tobacco demonstrates this danger. 
A third approach is the support of grain prices below the longer-run 
competitive price level with target prices and direct payments to farmers at 
whatever level agriculture is able to negotiate with society. If supplies 
are short, the power should be given government to limit exports when they 
are above certain levels and the central governments of the world are unduly 
taking advantage of the short supply situation. 
This would allow us to hold our foreign markets, let free markets prevail 
most of the time, limit extreme drops in farmers' incomes on the one hand and 
unlimited price rises to consumers and the livestock industry on the other. 
It would mean what we have on the books now with some adjustment upward in 
support and target prices. 
We probably should encourage and participate in the buildup of world 
stocks. Our domestic stocks should be modest, just sufficient to supply our 
foreign customers. There is little danger that our production will fall 
below domestic needs as long as we are geared to as large an export market as 
we presently are. 
Summary 
In summary four important criteria should be recognized in the develop-
ment of any U.S. food policy program: (1) a price policy that allows us to 
maintain our export markets, (2) flexibility to permit continued adjustments 
in U.S. agriculture, (3) protection for farmers against economic disaster, 
and (4) a means to limit exports to centrally controlled governments in times 
of severe world grain shortages. 
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